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ABSTRACT 
 
MORALITY, SOCIABILITY, AND COMPETENCE: 
DISTINCT AND INTERACTIVE DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL COGNITION 
Justin F. Landy 
Geoffrey P. Goodwin, PhD 
This research explores the structure of social cognitive judgments and the role of 
moral evaluations in everyday social cognition.  In Chapter 1, I show that morality and 
sociability are distinct dimensions in lay theories of personality and stereotype content, 
contrary to dominant two-dimensional models of social cognition that consider these to 
be two closely related aspects of a superordinate prosocial dimension of judgment.  In 
three studies, judgments of real targets’ morality and sociability did not factor together, 
differed in terms of mean levels, and did not correlate any more highly than they did with 
judgments of competence.  An additional study found that cluster analysis differentiated 
judgments of social groups on the basis of their perceived morality and sociability, and 
that these dimensions of judgment differently predicted intergroup emotions.  I also 
elaborate a functionalist account of why these three dimensions should matter in person 
and group perception.  In Chapter 2, I build on this functionalist account, and show that 
morality is the only one of these dimensions that is unambiguously positive – five studies 
show that sociability and competence are seen as positive attributes contingent upon a 
target’s positive morality, and are seen as less positive, and sometimes as truly negative, 
in immoral others.  Finally, in Chapter 3, I examine the importance of morality, 
sociability, and competence in the self.  It is widely accepted that people primarily care 
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about morality in others, but primarily care about competence in the self.  I challenge this 
assertion, and show that morality is highly valued in the self.  Three studies showed that 
people are often more upset by challenges to their morality than to their competence or 
sociability.  Moreover, the third study shows that reactions to threats to one’s morality, 
competence, and sociability engage different negative emotions.  I propose that morality 
is at least as central to people’s identities as competence, and that prior results suggesting 
that competence is primary are due to peoples’ high confidence regarding their own 
morality.  This program of research emphasizes the importance of morality in everyday 
social cognition and the distinctness of morality from other evaluative dimensions, 
particularly sociability.   
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MORALITY, SOCIABILITY, AND COMPETENCE ARE DISTINCT DIMENSIONS 
OF SOCIAL COGNITION 
Theories of person perception and stereotype content aim to identify the 
fundamental, default dimensions that structure the impressions that people form of 
individuals and the stereotypes they form of social categories.  Current theorizing in this 
area is dominated by the idea that we mentally classify the personalities of people and 
groups within a space defined by two principal dimensions.  One dimension captures how 
a person or group relates to others and is typically referred to as “warmth” (Fiske, Cuddy, 
& Glick, 2007), though sometimes also as “communion” (Abele & Wojciszke, 2013).  
The other dimension captures the ability of a person or group to accomplish their goals, 
and is usually referred to as “competence” (Fiske et al., 2007), though also sometimes as 
“agency” (Abele & Wojciszke, 2013) or “ability” (Brycz & Wojciszke, 1992).  Different 
researchers employ different names for these dimensions, but their theorizing largely 
overlaps (see Abele, Cuddy, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2008).   
Two-dimensional models of person perception and stereotyping have been highly 
generative, and have yielded important insights.  Nonetheless, I contend that these 
models are too coarse to provide a fully accurate picture of human social cognition.  In 
particular, they conflate, under the general heading of “warmth”, moral characteristics 
like honesty and trustworthiness, and less moral, more social traits like extroversion and 
friendliness, often referred to as “sociability” traits (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & 
Cherubini, 2011; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007).  This conflation of morality and 
sociability obscures the fact that many important moral character traits are not perceived 
as especially relevant to social warmth, and vice versa (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014; 
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see also Brambilla, Rusconi et al., 2011; Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & 
Yzerbyt, 2012; Leach et al., 2007).  It also obscures the fact that morality tends to be far 
more important than warmth or sociability in determining global impressions of others, as 
recent investigations have demonstrated (see e.g., Brambilla et al., 2011; Goodwin et al., 
2014).  However, while existing studies have treated morality and sociability as separate, 
they have not yet examined directly whether they constitute truly distinct dimensions in 
social judgment, or whether they instead cohere as part of a single dimension of 
judgment, as two-dimensional theories would predict.  Resolving this question was my 
aim in the present research.1 
Two-Dimensional Models of Social Cognition: A Brief History 
 Two-dimensional theories of social cognition originated with a seminal study of 
impression formation conducted by Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekanthan (1968), and have 
provided the theoretical framework for a diverse array of research in social cognition.  
They have been employed to understand social cognitive phenomena as diverse as 
impression formation (Brycz & Wojciszke, 1992; Rosenberg, Nelson, and 
Vivekananthan, 1998; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998), the interpretations of 
others’ behaviors (Wojciszke, 1994), self-evaluation (Wojciszke, Baryla, Parzuchowski, 
Szymkow, & Abele, 2011; Wojciszke & Dowhyluk, 2003), stereotypes of nationalities 
(Cuddy et al., 2009; Phalet & Poppe, 1997), and stereotypes of social groups within one’s 
own culture (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske, Xu, & Cuddy, 1999; Leach, 
Minescu, Poppe, & Hagendoorn, 2008). 
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 The content of intergroup stereotypes has been an especially active area of 
research, particularly since the inception of the Stereotype Content Model (SCM), which 
posits that stereotypes can be organized within a two-dimensional warmth-by-
competence space.  This model emphasizes that many stereotypes are not uniformly 
positive or negative, but rather are high on one dimension and low on the other (Fiske et 
al., 2002; Fiske et al., 1999).  Studies testing this theory have asked participants to rate 
societal groups on several warmth- and competence-related traits, according to the way 
that participants think each group is viewed by society (Fiske et al., 2002; Fiske et al., 
1999).  Cluster analyses have revealed that the group stereotypes tend to fall into four 
clusters organized by a two-dimensional space.  Each of these four clusters has been 
shown to produce distinct emotional responses, with high-warmth/high-competence 
groups (e.g., Whites and Christians) eliciting admiration, high-warmth/low-competence 
groups (e.g., housewives and the elderly), pity, low-warmth/high-competence groups 
(e.g., Asians and businesswomen), envy, and low-warmth/low-competence groups (e.g., 
welfare recipients and poor Blacks), contempt (Fiske et al., 2002). The fact that a 
majority of groups are rated as more warm than competent, or vice versa, is referred to as 
“ambivalent stereotyping,” and has been taken as pointing towards the separability of the 
two dimensions in question. 
Two “Fundamental Dimensions”? 
Two-dimensional models of person perception and stereotype content have now 
become so widely accepted that warmth and competence have been dubbed the 
“fundamental dimensions” of social cognition (Abele et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2007; 
Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005).  However, while such models have 
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yielded important insights, there are several reasons to doubt that two-dimensional 
models adequately represent the default dimensional structure of human social cognition.  
One issue is that the “warmth” dimension has been defined and operationalized in two 
different ways.  It is sometimes described as an indication of a person or group’s morality 
– for instance, Bergsieker, Leslie, Constantine, and Fiske (2012) state that “success in 
navigating interpersonal interactions requires accurately inferring others’ warmth (i.e., 
morality) and competence” (p. 1216, emphasis added; see also Fiske et al., 2002).  Yet, at 
other times, warmth is described in terms of sociability; in their discussion of stereotypes 
of low-warmth/high-competence groups, which typically elicit envy, Fiske et al. (2002) 
cite Asians as a prototypical example, arguing that Asians “are seen as too competent, too 
ambitious, too hardworking, and, simultaneously, not sociable” (p. 880, emphasis added).  
Similarly, in describing a “warm” target of judgment, Kervyn, Bergsieker, and Fiske 
(2012) used the terms nice, sociable, and outgoing, which are clearly more closely related 
to sociability than to morality.  Moreover, when warmth is measured directly, it is often 
with a mix of morality and sociability traits.  For instance, Fiske et al. (2002) measured 
warmth with four traits, two of which were “pure warmth” traits that have only minimal 
moral relevance: warm, good-natured, and two of which were more morally central traits: 
sincere, tolerant (see Goodwin et al., 2014).  Thus, as several researchers have noted, the 
warmth dimension appears to conflate aspects of both morality and sociability, and thus 
appears to have a bifurcated meaning (Bauman & Skitka, 2012; Brambilla, Rusconi et al., 
2011; Brambilla et al., 2012; Goodwin et al., 2014; Leach et al., 2007).  Indeed, 
proponents of two-dimensional models have sometimes explicitly argued that morality 
and sociability are simply parts of the same prosocial dimension.  For instance, Fiske et 
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al. (2007) refer to warmth traits as “moral-social” traits (p. 78), while Fiske et al. (2002) 
note that “the warmth scale includes elements of both sociality… and morality… but all 
are prosocial traits” (p. 889).2 
The conceptual distinction between morality and sociability can be seen clearly at 
the trait level.  Many prototypical moral traits – which are known to play an important 
role in impression formation – do not centrally involve “warmth,” in that they need not be 
infused with warm or affectionate feeling (e.g., being honest, just, principled, brave, 
dependable, loyal, dedicated, self-controlled, responsible, and so on), and they are not 
rated as being particularly relevant to interpersonal warmth (Goodwin et al., 2014).  
Conversely, there are many “warmth” traits that are not centrally related to morality, such 
as extroverted, gregarious, sociable, easy-going, friendly and playful (Goodwin et al., 
2014). Hence, although morality and warmth partially overlap, in that some traits seem to 
involve elements of both morality and warmth equally (e.g., kind, grateful, 
compassionate, forgiving, see Goodwin et al., 2014; see also Hardy, Walker, Olsen, 
Skalski, & Basinger, 2011; Smith, Türk Smith, & Christopher, 2007; Study 1.3, below), 
these dimensions are conceptually distinct.  
The fact that two-dimensional theories conflate morality and sociability might not 
be problematic if they were found to function in highly similar ways.  But, as 
considerable recent evidence indicates, morality and sociability play somewhat different 
roles in impression formation, with moral information tending to trump 
warmth/sociability information in overall importance.  The most comprehensive evidence 
of this sort comes from Goodwin et al. (2014).  Using correlational, experimental, and 
archival methods, these researchers consistently found that overall impressions of both 
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real and hypothetical targets were better predicted by information about the target’s moral 
goodness or character than by information about their interpersonal warmth.  Similar 
results pertaining specifically to moral traits related to honesty were reported by 
Brambilla and colleagues (Brambilla, Rusconi et al., 2011; Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, 
& Ellemers, 2013; Brambilla et al., 2012).  Goodwin et al. (2014) also found that overall 
impressions of real people described in obituaries were better predicted by morality 
information than by warmth/sociability information (Study 7).  Notably, in this study, the 
warmth/sociability information nonetheless predicted significant variance in overall 
impressions, independent of the contribution made by moral character information, 
consistent with the current hypothesis that morality and sociability are distinct 
dimensions of evaluation that contribute independently to the impressions that we form of 
others.   
Moreover, I think that there are good theoretical reasons to assert that morality 
and sociability are separate dimensions of person perception and stereotype content.  As 
many previous theorists have stressed, it is critically important to be able to predict 
others’ intentions towards us and people we care about; whether those others are likely to 
be helpful or harmful, respectful or disrespectful, and so on (see e.g., Abele & Wojciszke, 
2007; Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Wojciszke, Bazinska et al., 1998; Wojciszke, 
Dowhyluk et al., 1998; see also Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007; Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske 
et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2007).  But, in contrast to much prior theorizing, I suspect that 
this information is best conveyed by a person’s moral character rather than by their 
warmth/sociability (see also Goodwin et al., 2014).  Separate from moral character, 
competence (or agency) conveys a different sort of information, which is also critical in 
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social life – it indicates how effectively another person or group will carry out their goals 
and intentions (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Fiske et al., 2007).  Thus, it is plausible that 
both morality and competence are fundamental dimensions of social cognition because 
they each serve different functions. 
However, sociability information also conveys a distinct and important sort of 
information that two-dimensional models overlook.  Sociability traits, such as 
extroversion, convey how effectively a person can build alliances and recruit others to 
support their moral or immoral intentions (see Ashton, Lee, & Paunonen, 2002) – 
information that is important from an adaptive standpoint (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009).  
Someone who is outgoing, friendly, and charismatic will find it easier to recruit allies to 
support their plans and intentions than will someone who is introverted, cold, and quiet, 
regardless of whether their plans and intentions are benevolent or malevolent.  Indeed, it 
has been argued that the core element of the personality trait extroversion is not a mere 
preference for social interaction, but rather a tendency to attract social attention and 
garner social support, and that, as a consequence, “extraverts tend to win the competition 
for social attention over introverts and are thereby more likely to attract the most 
desirable allies, friends, and mates” (Ashton, Lee, & Paunonen, 2002, p. 251).  
Furthermore, it has been empirically demonstrated that extroverted individuals have 
larger social networks than do introverted individuals (Pollet, Roberts, & Dunbar, 2011).  
In turn, individuals with larger support networks are seen as particularly desirable as 
allies and exchange partners (Curry & Dunbar, 2011).  For the same reason, in contexts 
of group conflict, socially well-connected individuals are seen as more intimidating and 
formidable foes (Fessler & Holbrook, 2013). Thus, sociability may serve as a reliable cue 
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that an individual or group can build a network of contacts and allies that they can rely 
upon to help carry out their social intentions, whether these intentions are consistent or 
inconsistent with one’s own well-being.   
Overview of the Present Chapter 
I propose that morality and sociability constitute distinct dimensions of social 
cognition, alongside competence, such that all three dimensions capture a fundamentally 
different and important aspect of another person or group’s social functioning, and make 
independent contributions to a variety of social judgments.  In testing this assertion, I 
examined how many dimensions were revealed in factor analyses of trait ratings of 
individuals and groups (Studies 1.1-1.3); whether treating morality and sociability as 
separate dimensions helps elucidate key differences between social categories in cluster 
analysis (Study 1.4); and whether treating morality and sociability as separate dimensions 
helps discriminate the emotional reactions perceivers have towards different groups 
(Study 1.4).  Because two-dimensional models regard morality and sociability as 
comprising aspects of a single superordinate dimension, they predict that judgments of 
people’s and groups’ morality and sociability should be highly similar (in terms of mean 
levels), that they should correlate highly, that they will factor together, and that they will 
predict similar emotional responses.  In contrast, I predict that judgments of people and 
groups’ morality and sociability should often diverge (in terms of mean levels), that they 
should only be moderately correlated at most, that they will factor separately, and that 
they will predict different emotional responses.  The primary objective of this chapter 
was to pit these two hypotheses against one another. 
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Study 1.1 
Since Rosenberg et al.’s (1968) seminal study, research within the two-
dimensional tradition has tended to eschew genuinely exploratory studies of the 
dimensionality of participants’ judgments, in favor of studies that adopt a two-
dimensional model as a guiding theoretical framework.  In Study 1.1, I conducted an 
exploratory analysis of how people characterize others.   
This study builds on Rosenberg et al.’s famous study, but uses a more 
straightforward method.  Rosenberg et al.’s participants sorted 64 personality traits into 
categories that “go together,” and were encouraged to treat each category as a person that 
they knew.  The task required that participants use each trait term only once.  However, 
many personality traits are only imperfectly correlated with one another: while they 
might co-occur in some individuals, they diverge in other individuals.  An insistence that 
trait terms be used only once may obscure some of the important relations that are 
thought to exist between these traits (though see Wing & Nelson, 1972). I adopted an 
alternative, and more flexible, method, in which participants rate traits in people they 
know.  This task is arguably simpler, and provides a more naturalistic window into 
ordinary person-perception processes (for similar methods, see Goodwin et al., 2014; 
Wojciszcke, Bazinska et al., 1998).  In addition, using trait rating scales rather than 
simply indicating the presence or absence of a trait provides a more fine-grained measure. 
Accordingly, in Study 1.1, I had participants rate real people in their lives on a 
variety of traits that are conceptually related to morality, sociability, and competence, and 
factor analyzed their responses.  The key aim of this study was to assess whether morality 
and sociability terms factored together, or separately.  Whereas two-dimensional models 
10 
 
of person perception would predict a two-factor solution comprised of a single prosocial 
“warmth” factor (including both morality and sociability traits), and a separate 
competence factor, I hypothesized that separate morality, sociability, and competence 
factors would emerge consistently.  As a secondary prediction, I expected that many 
targets would be seen as significantly more moral than sociable, or vice versa, further 
supporting the notion that these are distinct constructs. 
Method 
 Participants.  Five hundred seventy-four participants, all located in the United 
States, were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange for monetary 
compensation.  Seven failed a “Captcha” question, strongly suggesting that they were 
automated “bot” programs, and 60 more did not complete the survey; these 67 
participants were excluded, leaving a final sample of N = 507.  The sample was 53% 
female and included a diverse range of ages (M = 32.8 years, SD = 12.1).  I recruited 
fairly large samples for Studies 1-3 (at least 400 participants per analysis) to ensure that 
the results of my factor analyses would be reliable (Field, 2005), and because I did not 
have clear a priori estimates of the effect sizes for my analyses. 
 Procedure.  Participants were told that they would be rating the personalities of 
several people that they knew on various trait dimensions.  Participants thought of six 
target individuals they knew personally, each one fitting a single criterion: someone that 
the participant liked, disliked, respected, and did not respect, a parent or parental figure, 
and a teacher or mentor. These six targets were chosen to cover a wide array of 
meaningful social relationships.  The first four targets were included because liking and 
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respect have both been an important focus of prior research on two-dimensional models 
of person perception (Wojciszke, Abele, & Baryla, 2009), and the latter two targets were 
added to increase coverage across a diverse range of relationships.  In order to ensure that 
participants were thinking of a particular person in their life, they were asked to type in 
the initials of this person.   
Participants indicated how much each target possessed eighteen personality traits 
on nine-point Likert scales.  Six traits each were hypothesized to relate to morality 
(moral, principled, honest, trustworthy, fair, responsible), sociability (sociable, warm, 
friendly, easy-going, extroverted, playful), and competence (competent, capable, 
intelligent, effective, skillful, talented) on the basis of prior research (Goodwin et al., 
2014, Study 1).  After these six pages, participants completed a brief demographic 
questionnaire.  Aside from basic demographic information, no unreported measures were 
collected in this or any other study in this dissertation. 
Results 
 Factor analyses.  For each target, I factor analyzed participants’ trait ratings 
using Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation3 and parallel analysis 
(O’Connor, 2000) as my extraction method. 
 As predicted, three factors were retained for all six targets.  In all but one case, 
traits loaded most highly on their predicted factors (mean factor loading: .75, Range: .51-
.86), and cross-loadings were generally low.4  On average, the retained factors explained 
65.59% of the variance in participants’ judgments (Range: 62.21-69.91).  Moreover, the 
third factor explained a substantial amount of variance (unrotated M = 9.50%, Range: 
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7.81-11.49; rotated M = 19.37%, Range: 17.93-20.34) over and above the first two 
factors.  In sum, separate morality and sociability factors, rather than a combined 
“warmth” factor, emerged from participants’ ratings for all six targets. 
 Within-target comparisons of morality, sociability, and competence.  I created 
composite morality, sociability, and competence scales (αs > .80) for each target by 
averaging participants’ ratings on the six traits that consistently loaded on each factor in 
order to test my secondary hypothesis that many targets would be seen as more moral 
than sociable, or vice versa.  Indeed, every target’s morality ratings differed significantly 
from its sociability ratings (see Table 1.1 for means and standard deviations; ps < .004 by 
paired-samples t-tests, repeated-measures ds > .13, see Morris & DeShon, 2008, Equation 
8).  These results therefore provide further evidence for the distinctness of morality and 
sociability judgments.  Furthermore, as Table 1 also shows, the disliked, disrespected, 
parent, and teacher targets differed in their morality and competence, ps < .002, ds > .14, 
and all six targets differed in their sociability and competence, ps <. 02, ds > .11.  
Correlations between morality, sociability, and competence.  I also computed 
bivariate correlations between the composite morality, sociability, and competence scales 
for each target.  All three dimensions correlated positively with one another for every 
target, all ps < .001, which likely reflects participants’ overall positive or negative regard 
for each target.  More importantly, for each target, the morality-sociability correlation (M 
= .37; Range: .22-.56) was never larger than the morality-competence correlation (M = 
.61; Range: .54-.71), and was only larger than the sociability-competence correlation (M 
= .37; Range: .29-.56) for the respected target.  This strongly argues against the idea that 
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morality and sociability are especially closely related and can be subsumed within one 
broader dimension. 
Discussion 
 In Study 1.1, factor analyses yielded separate morality and sociability factors for 
all six targets, rather than a single overarching, prosocial factor, and all six targets were 
seen as either more moral than sociable, or vice versa.  Study 1.2 used a similar method 
to investigate whether morality and sociability emerge as separate dimensions in 
evaluations of groups.   
Study 1.2 
Method 
 Participants.  A new sample of 600 participants, all located in the U.S., were 
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange for monetary compensation.  
Five failed a “Captcha” question, and 85 did not complete the survey, leaving a final 
sample of N = 510.  The sample was 48% female and included a diverse range of ages (M 
= 33.4 years, SD = 11.7). 
 Method.  The method of this study closely resembled Study 1.1, but with social 
categories as targets rather than individual people.  Participants thought of nine social 
categories that Americans generally respect, do not respect, like, dislike, admire, envy, 
pity, feel contempt toward, and fear.  The first four prompts were modeled after the first 
four targets in Study 1.1, while the first four affective prompts capture the intergroup 
emotions emphasized in Fiske and colleagues’ (2002) Stereotype Content Model.  Fear 
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was included because recent research has noted the importance of appraisals of threat in 
intergroup relations (Brambilla et al., 2013; Brambilla et al., 2012).   
After indicating which social category they were thinking about for each prompt, 
participants rated how American society viewed that social category, on the eighteen trait 
terms from Study 1.1, using nine-point Likert scales.  I asked participants to rate how 
each group is viewed by society, rather than to provide their own personal beliefs, 
because this method arguably reduces self-presentational concerns, and it is standard 
procedure in stereotype content research (see e.g., Brambilla, Carnaghi, & Ravenna, 
2011; Fiske et al., 2002). 
Results 
 Factor Analyses.  As in Study 1.1, I factor analyzed ratings of each target group 
on the eighteen trait terms using Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation, 
with parallel analysis as the extraction method.  Once again, three factors emerged for all 
nine targets.  With only seven exceptions out of 162 factor loadings, the trait terms 
loaded most highly on their predicted factors (mean factor loading: .77; Range: .50-.90) 
and cross-loadings tended to be low.  The retained factors explained, on average, 72.45% 
of the variance in participants’ responses (Range: 68.56-76.16%), and the third factor 
explained a substantial amount of variance (unrotated M = 10.29%, Range: 7.52-12.78%; 
rotated M = 20.71%, Range: 17.50-22.40%) over and above the first two factors.  
 Within-group comparisons of morality, sociability, and competence.  I again 
averaged together the six terms that typically loaded on each factor to create composite 
morality, sociability, and competence scales for each target (αs > .84).  Within-subjects t-
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tests revealed that eight out of nine target groups differed significantly in their morality 
and sociability ratings, ps < .03, ds > .09 (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations).  
The only exception was the pitied group, although there was a trend toward this group 
being rated higher on sociability than morality, p = .08, d = .08.  All nine groups also 
differed significantly in their morality and competence ratings, all ps < .002, ds > .15, and 
in their sociability and competence ratings, all ps < .002, ds >.14. 
Correlations between morality, sociability, and competence.  As in Study 1.1, 
I calculated bivariate correlations between my composite morality, sociability, and 
competence scales for each target group.  Once again, all three scales correlated 
positively for every group, ps < .001.  And, as in the previous study, the morality-
sociability correlation (M = .48, Range: .27-.69) was not larger than the morality-
competence correlation (M = .58, Range: .45-.72) for any group, though it was larger than 
the sociability-competence correlation (M = .35, Range: .23-.62) for all nine groups.   
Discussion 
 Study 1.2 revealed the same dissociation between morality and sociability 
observed in Study 1.1 with stereotypes of groups rather than impressions of individual 
people.  I once again found a three-factor solution for every target of judgment and the 
factors were clearly interpretable as morality, sociability, and competence.  
Study 1.3 
 One possible criticism of Studies 1.1 and 1.2 is that my trait sets primarily 
consisted of what might be called “pure” examples of each of my three hypothesized 
dimensions.  I did not include traits that spanned more than one dimension, for instance, 
16 
 
traits that instantiate both morality and sociability, such as compassionate and humble.  It 
remains conceivable that when such “blended” traits are included, the morality and 
sociability factors would collapse into a single warmth factor.  To address this concern, in 
Study 1.3, I employed the same basic design of Studies 1.1 and 1.2, but included three 
new sets of blended traits that simultaneously instantiate morality and sociability, 
morality and competence, and sociability and competence, respectively.  
Method 
 Participants.  Nine hundred one participants were recruited through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk.  Nineteen failed a “Captcha” question, and 84 more did not complete 
the survey, leaving a final sample of N = 798.  The sample was 43% female and 
represented a diverse range of ages (M = 33.9 years, SD = 11.7). 
Procedure.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of two versions of the 
study: People or Groups.  In the People version (n = 414), participants nominated people 
that they knew personally whom they liked, disliked, respected, and did not respect, as in 
Study 1.1, and rated each of these four people on the 18 traits listed in Table 1.3.  In the 
Groups version (n = 384), participants nominated social categories that Americans 
generally like, dislike, respect, and do not respect, as in Study 1.2, and rated each 
category on the 18 traits listed in Table 1.3.  These trait terms were derived from the 
results of a pre-study (see Appendix A) and included three “pure” traits from each of my 
hypothesized dimensions, and three traits that represented each of the “blended” 
categories: morality and sociability, morality and competence, and sociability and 
competence. 
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Results 
 As in Studies 1.1 and 1.2, I factor analyzed ratings of each target on the eighteen 
trait terms using Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation, with parallel 
analysis as the extraction method.  Once again, three factors emerged for all eight targets, 
and were clearly identifiable as morality, sociability, and competence.  The nine “pure” 
traits always loaded most highly on their hypothesized factors (mean factor loading: .75; 
Range: .66-.83) and cross-loadings tended to be low.  As would be expected, the 
“blended” traits showed some variability in which factors they loaded most highly on, 
and occasionally cross-loaded on more than one dimension.  This was especially 
prevalent among the morality/competence traits.  However, the morality/sociability traits 
always loaded most highly on the morality factor, suggesting that the moral element of 
these traits was predominant (see also Goodwin et al., 2014).  Table 1.3 presents the 
frequencies with which each trait term loaded most highly on each factor.  The main 
upshot of these findings is that including the blended traits did not cause the morality and 
sociability factors to collapse into a single warmth factor.  Instead, a three-dimensional 
solution was found for every single target, as in the prior studies. 
On average, the retained factors explained 66.68% of the total variance in 
participants’ responses (Range: 60.07%-76.06%), and the third factor explained a 
substantial amount of variance (unrotated M = 8.46%, Range: 7.39%-9.91%; rotated M = 
17.79%, Range: 15.33%-18.42%) over and above the first two factors.   
Discussion 
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 In Study 1.3, when using a broader trait set, I again found three clearly 
interpretable factors in ratings of both people and groups.  This therefore allows for more 
confidence in the generality of my earlier results.  Across three exploratory studies, 
people’s implicit theories of both individual and group personality were more accurately 
captured by a three-factor solution than a two-factor solution.  
Study 1.4 
In Study 1.4, participants rated a large set of predetermined groups and 
professions on traits reflecting morality, sociability, and competence, and indicated the 
extent to which each group or profession elicits various emotions.  The study had two 
aims: to investigate the utility of separating morality and sociability as underpinning 
group stereotypes, and to investigate how morality, sociability, and competence each 
predict distinct emotional responses towards these groups.  I predicted that cluster 
analysis would reveal that at least some clusters of groups and professions would be 
judged higher on morality than on sociability or vice versa, and that at the group level, 
many groups would also differ in their morality and sociability.  Moreover, I predicted 
that morality, sociability, and competence ratings would play different roles in predicting 
emotional reactions to groups. 
Method 
 Participants. One thousand seventy-five participants located in the U.S. were 
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange for monetary compensation.  
Twenty-three failed a “Captcha” question, and 67 more did not complete the survey, 
leaving a final sample of N = 985.  The sample was 42% female and was comprised of a 
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diverse range of ages (M = 31.4 years, SD = 11.1).  This study required a very large 
sample because each participant received only a subset of all of the stimuli (see below). 
 Target Groups.  Ninety groups were included as targets of judgment in this 
study, though to keep the task manageable, each participant rated only six groups.  The 
90 groups consisted of the 38 social groups included in the two major papers 
investigating the SCM in American samples (Fiske et al., 2002; Fiske et al., 1999), 41 
professions retained from a pre-study (see Appendix A), and 11 additional groups of 
theoretical interest.  I included professions because people likely have highly stereotypic 
ideas of what members of various professions are like, although this has been relatively 
understudied in stereotyping research.  The resulting set of 90 groups constituted a 
considerably larger array of groups than has been previously considered in stereotype 
content research.  The full set of groups is presented in Table A.2, in Appendix A. 
Procedure.  Participants were randomly assigned to view one of fifteen sets of six 
target groups.  These sets were generated randomly, with the constraint that highly 
similar groups (e.g., Black people and Black professionals) were not included in the same 
set.  Participants rated how each group is viewed by American society on five morality 
traits, five sociability traits, and five competence traits.  The traits were the same as those 
used in Studies 1.1 and 1.2, except that one term from each dimension (responsible, easy-
going, and effective) was dropped to shorten the length of the study (these trait terms had 
generally shown lower factor loadings than the other trait terms in Study 1.1).   
Participants then rated how the group makes the typical American feel, on 29 
emotion terms (see Table 5 for the 29 emotion terms and factor loadings).  Twenty-four 
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of these emotion terms were drawn from Study 1.4 of Fiske et al. (2002), though I 
phrased them as nouns rather than adjectives.  To these I added five new terms: 
condescension, disdain, irritation, affection, and joy. Responses to both the trait terms 
and the emotion terms were made on a nine-point Likert scale. 
Results  
 Cluster Analysis.  Composite morality, sociability, and competence scales were 
computed for each target by averaging the five relevant traits (αs > .70 in 98.8% of 
cases).  For the purposes of this analysis, group-level means on these composite scales 
were used as data.  In order to ensure that my results are easily comparable with previous 
research on the SCM, I followed the same two-step cluster analytic procedure used by 
Fiske et al. (1999; Fiske et al., 2002), who drew their procedure from Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, and Black (1995); hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s (1963) method was 
used to determine how many clusters to retain, and k-means cluster analysis was then 
used to assign target groups to clusters.  Five clusters were retained; cluster memberships 
are presented in Table A.2 in Appendix A.   
Cluster 1 was characterized by high sociability (M = 5.37) but lower morality (M 
= 4.08), p = .002, within-subjects d = .87, and competence (M = 4.05), p < .001, d = 1.17 
(morality and competence ratings did not differ from one another, p = .91, d = .03).  It 
included such groups as salespeople and politicians – who may be seen as being warm 
and friendly, but disingenuous, untrustworthy, or duplicitous – and strippers and sexy 
women – who may be seen as extroverted (or at least, as lacking shyness) but 
questionable in their moral character.  Conversely, Cluster 2 was characterized by higher 
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morality (M = 6.67) than sociability (M = 5.41), p < .001, d = 1.37, higher competence 
(M = 7.42) than morality, p < .001, d = 1.12, and higher competence than sociability, p < 
.001, d = 1.88.  This cluster included groups such as judges, firefighters, soldiers, doctors, 
and librarians, who may be seen as having a certain seriousness or sternness (i.e., as not 
“warm”), but as nonetheless being very moral.  Cluster 2 also included Asians, a group 
that is classified as competent but cold in the two-dimensional space of the SCM.  In line 
with research on anti-Asian stereotypes (Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005), the present 
results suggest that the low perceived “warmth” of Asians was driven by a perception that 
they are not sociable or outgoing, rather than by any mistrust of their morality, which was 
rated rather highly (6.04 out of 9, compared with 4.58 for sociability).  Groups in Cluster 
3 were rated as quite low on all three dimensions, especially morality (M = 2.20), and 
included such reviled groups as drug dealers, terrorists, and the poor.  For this cluster, 
sociability ratings (M = 3.14) were higher than morality ratings, p = .009, d = 1.05, as 
were competence ratings (M = 2.99), p = .02, d = .86, but sociability and competence did 
not differ from one another, p = .74, d = .11.  Thus, while these disliked groups are 
denigrated on all three dimensions, their morality is seen as especially dubious.  In sum, 
three out of five clusters showed greater morality than sociability, or vice versa, and 
about half of the target groups (n = 46) fell into one of these three clusters, thereby 
providing further evidence that judgments of morality and sociability are distinct. 
Cluster 4 included groups that were rated fairly high on all three dimensions 
(MMorality = 5.67, MSociability = 5.94, MCompetence = 5.86; pairwise comparisons: all ps > .12, 
ds < .28).  It primarily included societal in-groups such as Christians, Whites, and the 
middle class. Cluster 5 groups (e.g., rich people) were primarily characterized by high 
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competence (M = 5.46), and had higher competence than morality (M = 3.85) or 
sociability (M = 3.95), ps < .001, ds > 1.47, which did not differ from one another, p = 
.68, d =.12.   
 Within-group comparisons of morality, sociability, and competence.  Using 
participant-level data, I used paired-samples t-tests to compare the composite morality, 
sociability, and competence ratings of each of the target groups.  Consistent with my 
theorizing, 78 out of 90 groups were judged to be significantly higher on one of these 
dimensions than the other, ps < .05, ds > .29 (see Table A2).  Seventy-five out of 90 
differed significantly in their morality and competence, ps < .05, ds > .24, and 81 out of 
90 differed significantly in their sociability and competence, ps < .05, ds > .26, thus 
overwhelmingly supporting the distinctness of all three dimensions.   
 Factor analysis of emotion terms.  I factor analyzed the group-level means for 
the 29 emotion terms using Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation and 
parallel analysis as the extraction method.  Based on the parallel analysis, three factors 
were retained.  The first, “antipathy” factor consisted of emotion terms related to fear, 
hatred, contempt, and similar negative emotions.  The second, “admiration” factor 
consisted of terms related to pride, respect, and more general positivity.  The third, 
“sympathy” factor consisted of the terms sympathy, pity, and compassion.  A fourth 
factor emerged with an eigenvalue of 1.33, consisting of the synonymous terms 
“jealousy” and “envy”.  Although this eigenvalue was not larger than the randomly 
generated eigenvalue derived via parallel analysis, I retained it (as “envy”) because it was 
clearly interpretable and consistent with prior theory. These four factors (antipathy, 
admiration, sympathy, envy) resemble the four intergroup emotions in the SCM – 
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contempt, admiration, pity, envy – with the major differences being that my antipathy 
factor is more strongly related to fear and anxiety than it is to contempt, and that my 
sympathy factor is more related to compassion and empathy than to pity.  Factor loadings 
for the 29 emotion terms are presented in Table A.3. 
 Regressions predicting emotional reactions.  I next used linear regressions to 
examine the roles that morality, sociability, and competence played individually and 
interactively in predicting the four emotion factors derived above.  For each factor, I 
averaged each group’s ratings on the emotion terms comprising that factor (reverse 
scoring in the one instance where it was necessary).  I then treated this composite score as 
the outcome variable in a linear regression.  For each regression, I entered mean-centered 
group-level morality, sociability, and competence ratings, their two-way interactions, and 
their three-way interaction as predictors.  Standardized regression coefficients are 
presented in Table 1.4.  
Antipathy was significantly negatively predicted by both morality and sociability, 
though morality was the stronger predictor.  The fact that these two dimensions exerted 
independent effects provides additional evidence of their distinctness.  This result is not 
predicted by two-dimensional theories, which treat morality and sociability as sub-
components of a broader prosocial, “warmth” dimension.  Competence did not 
significantly predict antipathy, nor was any interaction term significant. 
 Admiration was positively predicted by morality, sociability, and competence, 
thus revealing independent effects of all three dimensions.  Morality was the strongest 
predictor, closely followed by sociability.  These first-order effects were qualified by a 
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significant two-way, morality-by-sociability interaction (see Figure A.1).  Immoral 
groups received little admiration regardless of their sociability.  Moral groups, on the 
other hand, received even greater admiration when they were also sociable.  That is, 
sociability seems to contribute to group admiration mainly in the presence of morality.  
This interaction between morality and sociability provides further evidence of the 
independence of these two dimensions, since two variables can only interact if there is a 
substantial dissociation between them.   
 The best predictor of sympathy was competence; the less competent the group, 
the more sympathy it received.  The only other significant predictor was morality; 
immoral groups received less sympathy than moral groups.  Sociability did not predict 
sympathy, nor were any interaction terms significant.  This suggests that prior results 
showing that pity is elicited by groups high in “warmth” but low in competence (Fiske et 
al., 2002) may have been driven by the groups’ perceived high morality, which was 
conflated with the groups’ sociability within assessments of “warmth” (though it should 
be kept in mind that my sympathy factor does not exactly overlap with pity in the SCM).   
 The best predictor of envy was competence; unsurprisingly, more competent 
groups were envied more than less competent groups (see Fiske et al., 2002).  Both 
morality and sociability also predicted envy, but in opposite directions; envy was directed 
toward less moral groups but toward more sociable groups.  This result poses a major 
challenge for two-dimensional theories, which assume that morality and sociability can 
be subsumed under a single broad, prosocial dimension.  According to this assumption, 
morality and sociability should predict similar emotional responses once separated – a 
prediction that is clearly falsified in the present context.  Moreover, there was a 
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significant two-way, morality-by-sociability interaction (Figure A.2), just as there was for 
admiration.  Highly moral groups appeared to be the targets of little envy regardless of 
their sociability (i.e., highly moral groups are admired, not envied).  However, immoral 
groups were envied more when they were also sociable, perhaps because of a belief that 
their sociability brings them benefits that they do not deserve (e.g., a warm but immoral 
politician or businessman may be envied for achieving social status without playing by 
the rules).   
Discussion  
Study 1.4 indicated the utility of separating morality and sociability when 
accounting for the stereotypes of real social groups, and showed that morality and 
sociability predict different emotional responses towards those groups. The vast majority 
of groups (approximately 87%) were rated significantly differently in terms of their 
morality and sociability. Emotional responses towards these groups, including antipathy, 
admiration, envy, and sympathy, were predicted in clearly different ways by morality and 
sociability.  In increasing order of evidential significance: these two dimensions exerted 
statistically independent predictive effects for all four emotions (in the case of sympathy, 
only morality was predictive); they exerted interactive effects for admiration and envy; 
and they exerted entirely opposite effects for envy.  All of these results are difficult to 
explain on the view that morality and sociability are slightly different aspects of the same 
evaluative dimension, and are better accounted for by the view that morality and 
sociability are, in fact, separate dimensions of social cognition. 
General Discussion 
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I have proposed that morality, sociability and competence are distinct dimensions 
that underlie basic person and group perception processes. Each of these dimensions 
conveys distinct social-functional information.  A person’s moral character reveals the 
true nature of their intentions towards you (e.g., whether or not they will act with your 
welfare in mind). A person’s sociability reveals how likely they are to be able to recruit 
allies to support them in pursuing their intentions (Ashton et al., 2002), and thus, how 
desirable they might be as a potential ally, or how formidable they might be as a potential 
foe.  And, a person’s competence yields information about how effectively that person 
will carry out their goals and intentions.  
My findings are much better accounted for by models that include at least these 
three dimensions of social cognition than by current two-dimensional models which 
stress only warmth and competence.  In Studies 1.1-1.3, factor analyses of participants’ 
ratings of real individuals and social groups consistently revealed three factors underlying 
their ratings, corresponding to the hypothesized dimensions of morality, sociability, and 
competence.  The third factor in each analysis explained a non-trivial amount of variance.  
Most critically, morality and sociability terms did not load together on a composite 
prosocial, “warmth” factor, as current two-dimensional models would predict. In Study 
1.4, morality and sociability again diverged: in judgments of the stereotypic traits of large 
number of social groups, and in predicting emotional responses to those groups. In the 
most theoretically pertinent cases, morality and sociability interacted to predict 
admiration and envy, and they predicted envy in opposite directions.  
Relation to Past Research   
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One might be skeptical of my theorizing because prior research seems so 
consistently to have supported existing two-dimensional models.  However, the strength 
of the prior evidence in favor of two-dimensional models is arguably not as clear as it is 
often presumed to be.  Much existing research does not explicitly set out to test two-
dimensional models, but rather assumes a two-dimensional framework as a starting point, 
then examines its consequences in a novel domain of social cognition. I suspect that 
assuming a two-dimensional framework as a starting point may have led to experimental 
designs and stimuli choices that increase the likelihood that observed results will 
apparently accord with a two-dimensional framework.  For instance, most research within 
the two-dimensional tradition has included a relatively limited range of warmth and 
competence trait terms that accord only with the two postulated dimensions (e.g., Abele 
& Wojciszke, 2007; Clausell & Fiske, 2005; Fiske et al., 1999, 2002; Leach et al., 2008).  
As a result, these studies have tended to lack a thorough coverage (and careful division) 
of both morality and sociability traits.  Thus, despite the assertion that “warmth and 
competence dimensions emerge consistently” (Fiske et al., 2007, p. 77), it is arguably 
more accurate to say that the warmth and competence dimensions were imposed upon 
many prior studies, rather than emerged from them.    
Research by Brycz and Wojciszke (1992) provides auxiliary support for the 
distinctness of morality and sociability information.  In this study, participants were 
presented with positive and negative information about a target person’s sociability or 
morality.  Their overall evaluation of the target person based on incongruent sociability 
information was positive, whereas their overall evaluation of the person based on 
incongruent morality information was negative.  When participants were then presented 
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with additional positive information, judgments in the sociability condition quickly 
shifted to align with this new information (i.e., becoming increasingly positive), whereas 
judgments in the morality condition shifted more slowly, showing an entrenched 
negativity bias. These findings therefore show that people process information about 
sociability quite differently from information about morality. 
Theoretical Contributions and Future Directions   
My work builds upon recent research on the distinct roles that morality, 
sociability, and competence play in person and group perception.  Most of this work has 
focused on the relatively greater role that morality as opposed to warmth/sociability 
information has on impression formation both at the individual (Brambilla, Rusconi et al., 
2011; Brambilla et al., 2013; Goodwin et al., 2014) and group level (Brambilla et al., 
2012; Leach et al., 2007).  While some of this prior research has distinguished between 
morality and sociability, prior investigations have not specifically focused on whether 
morality and sociability should be conceived as separate dimensions of social cognition, 
as opposed to sub-components of a single overarching prosocial dimension (“warmth”), 
alongside competence.  Hence, the primary contribution of the present work is to 
demonstrate comprehensively that morality and sociability do not together comprise one 
dimension of evaluation in naturalistic judgments, and that each dimension plays an 
important and distinctive role in social cognitive judgments.   
One potential criticism of my approach – which extends to the approach utilized 
by researchers within the two-dimensional tradition as well – is that I always selected the 
traits used, rather than having participants generate them. I therefore wanted to provide 
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some assurance that people naturally attribute traits related to the postulated dimensions 
of morality, sociability, and competence when thinking about real social targets.  Using 
an entirely bottom-up procedure, I had 75 American adults think of two different social 
groups, one group that American society has a positive view of, and another that 
American society has a negative view of.  For each target group, participants nominated 
“one personality trait that American society typically associates” with the group.  
Morality traits (e.g., moral, violent, generous, greedy, honest, trustworthy, kind, loyal, 
deceitful, brave) were the most frequent, comprising 59.3% of the traits offered. 
Competence traits were the next most frequent (17.3%; e.g., intelligent, ignorant, 
hardworking), followed by sociability traits (10.7%; e.g., happy, fun).  A substantial 
minority of participants (24.7%) offered unscorable responses or traits that were not 
dispositional, such as rich, good-looking, etc.5  Thus, these results provide preliminary 
evidence that the traits employed in the present research are consistent with the kinds of 
traits people naturally generate in their appraisals of real targets (in this case, groups).  
Morality, sociability, and competence may not represent the only fundamental 
dimensions of social cognition.  The three dimensions that I have investigated here each 
convey information about different functionally important aspects of our social world, so 
there is some theoretical reason to think that these could constitute a “big three” of social 
perception.  But I acknowledge that there are possibly other important social-functional 
needs that may map onto other important dimensions of social cognition.  An even larger 
set of traits than the one I employed might result in a factor structure that extends beyond 
morality, sociability, and competence.  However, this point does not detract from the 
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main thrust of the present research, which is to highlight morality and sociability, 
specifically, as independent dimensions of social cognition.  
Conclusion   
The four studies presented in this chapter provide support for the distinctness of 
morality, sociability, and competence as underlying dimensions of social cognition.  
These findings accord naturally with the theory that morality and sociability serve 
different social functions.  I therefore view the present results as providing an important 
first step toward a richer model of social cognition that is psychologically more accurate, 
though admittedly less parsimonious, than current two-dimensional models.  
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Footnotes 
1 Throughout this dissertation, I distinguish morality from “sociability”, rather 
than from “warmth.”  The term “sociability” is close in meaning to “warmth”, but I prefer 
the term “sociability” because it is more precise (see below), and because it has been the 
term of choice in some recent theorizing (see e.g., Brambilla, Rusconi et al., 2011; Leach 
et al., 2007). 
2 My use of the term “prosocial” to denote this superordinate dimension is not 
intended to coincide with a technical use of the term “prosociality”, which refers 
specifically to altruistic behavior.   Rather, I intend a broader, everyday meaning, 
captured by the quote above by Fiske and colleagues, in which the term “prosocial” 
includes elements of both sociability and morality.  This more everyday sense of 
prosocial has an antonymic relation to the everyday sense of the term “antisocial”, which 
sometimes refers to a lack of sociability, but other times, to a lack of morality (see 
“Antisocial”, n.d.). 
3 The results of the factor analyses in Studies 1.1-1.3 do not change appreciably 
when an oblique rotation (direct oblimin) is applied instead. 
4 “Responsible” loaded slightly higher on the competence factor (.55) than the 
morality factor (.51) for the disrespected target.  This was the only instance in which a 
term did not load most highly on its hypothesized factor. 
5 Some responses resembled the “blended” traits in Study 1.3, in that they 
contained elements of more than one dimension.  These were counted as instantiating 
both dimensions, which is why the sum of the presented percentages is slightly higher 
than 100%.  
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Table 1.1.  Means and standard deviations of composite morality, sociability, and 
competence scales for each target in Study 1.1. 
 Morality Sociability Competence 
Respected Target 7.84 (1.06)a 6.89 (1.37)b 7.85 (1.00)a 
Liked Target 7.45 (1.21)a 7.26 (1.21)b 7.41 (1.19)a 
Disliked Target 3.23 (1.68)a 4.58 (1.80)b 4.30 (1.82)c 
Disrespected Target 3.16 (1.59)a 4.70 (1.82)b 4.26 (1.86)c 
Parent/Parental Figure 7.30 (1.54)a 6.51 (1.51)b 7.03 (1.51)c 
Teacher/Mentor 7.74 (1.16)a 6.87 (1.38)b 7.88 (1.07)c 
 
Note. Within rows, cells with no common subscript differ significantly, p < .05. 
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Table 1.2. Means and standard deviations of composite morality, sociability, and 
competence scales for each group in Study 1.2. 
 Morality Sociability Competence 
Respected Group 7.32 (1.34)a 5.84 (1.52)b 7.53 (1.28)c 
Liked Group 6.67 (1.59)a 6.84 (1.28)b 7.11 (1.47)c 
Disliked Group 2.87 (1.60)a 3.79 (1.77)b 4.10 (2.03)c 
Disrespected Group 2.53 (1.64)a 3.68 (1.87)b 3.33 (1.93)c 
Admired Group 6.77 (1.67)a 6.35 (1.48)b 7.57 (1.20)c 
Envied Group 4.81 (1.70)a 5.62 (1.55)b 6.88 (1.60)c 
Pitied Group 4.50 (1.91)a 4.61 (1.65)a 3.62 (1.83)b 
Contempt Group 2.85 (1.80)a 3.84 (1.87)b 4.17 (2.12)c 
Feared Group 2.77 (1.86)a 3.06 (1.71)b 4.26 (2.04)c 
 
Note. Within rows, cells with no common subscript differ significantly, p < .05. 
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Table 1.3. Trait terms from Study 1.3, theoretical categories based on the pre-study, and 
frequencies with which each trait loaded most highly on each factor. 
Trait 
Hypothesized 
Category Morality Sociability Competence 
Moral Morality 8 0 0 
Honest Morality 8 0 0 
Fair Morality 8 0 0 
Sociable Sociability 0 8 0 
Friendly Sociability 2 6 0 
Extroverted Sociability 0 8 0 
Competent Competence 0 0 8 
Effective Competence 0 0 8 
Talented Competence 0 0 8 
Humble Morality/Sociability 8 0 0 
Respectful Morality/Sociability 8 0 0 
Compassionate Morality/Sociability 8 0 0 
Principled Morality/Competence 6 0 2 
Responsible Morality/Competence 2 0 6 
Disciplined Morality/Competence 0 0 8 
Cooperative Sociability/Competence 8 0 0 
Enthusiastic Sociability/Competence 0 8 0 
Dynamic Sociability/Competence 0 7 1 
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Table 1.4.  Standardized regression coefficients (beta weights) predicting group-level 
antipathy, admiration, sympathy, and envy ratings in Study 1.4. 
 Antipathy Admiration Sympathy Envy 
Morality -.72*** .51*** .93*** -.64*** 
Sociability -.26** .41*** .04 .42*** 
Competence .10 .25*** -1.03*** .88*** 
Morality x Sociability .18 .22* -.16 -.32* 
Morality x Competence -.04 .10 .03 -.06 
Sociability x Competence -.09 -.15 .26 .10 
Morality x Sociability x 
Competence 
-.03 -.03 .20 -.25 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
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THE DESIRABILITY OF SOCIABILITY AND COMPETENCE DEPENDS ON 
MORALITY 
As discussed at length in Chapter 1, social cognition researchers have posited that 
there are two “fundamental dimensions” along which we categorize other people (Abele, 
Cuddy, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2008; Fiske, 2012; Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2007; Judd, James-
Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005).  The dimension of warmth is an assessment of 
how a person interacts with others, while the dimension of competence is an assessment 
of a person’s ability to accomplish tasks effectively.  One attractive feature of this line of 
theorizing is that it accounts for why these dimensions are so important to social 
judgment from a functionalist standpoint (Fiske et al., 2007).  Each dimension is said to 
convey distinct, functionally important information: warmth is said to convey 
information about a person’s intentions (is the person benevolent or hostile?), while 
competence is said to convey information about a person’s ability to carry out their 
intentions successfully. 
 Recently, it has been noted that the dimension of warmth seems to conflate two 
distinct aspects of a person: morality – exemplified by traits like honesty, fairness, and 
sincerity – and sociability – exemplified by traits like friendliness, extroversion, and 
playfulness (Bauman & Skitka, 2012; Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; 
Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt, 2012; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 
2014; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007).  Morality plays a more important role than 
sociability in determining impressions of others (Goodwin et al., 2014), and ratings of 
morality and sociability in judgments of real individuals do not cohere (see Chapter 1), 
providing evidence that these are best thought of as separate dimensions of social 
cognition, alongside competence. 
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 What, then, becomes of the functionalist account of why warmth and competence 
are so important?  As argued in Chapter 1, morality, sociability, and competence do each 
make distinct contributions to social cognition.  In my model, morality indicates whether 
a person’s intentions are likely to be positive or negative toward us – that is, morality has 
the same function ascribed to warmth in two-dimensional models of social judgment.  
Competence indicates whether the person is likely to accomplish what they intend to do, 
just as in existing two-dimensional models.  Sociability, however, has a different role – it 
indicates whether a person is likely to be able to recruit allies to support and help 
accomplish their intentions, whether or not those intentions are positive or negative.  In 
this way, each kind of information conveys something unique and functionally important 
about others in our social worlds.   
 Sociability and competence, therefore, both contribute to one’s ability to 
accomplish one’s goals, though in different ways.  This straightforwardly leads to the 
following predictions: morality should always be desirable in others, because it is always 
better for us if others have positive rather than negative intentions toward us.  However, 
sociability and competence should be desired contingent upon morality.  That is, if a 
person is able to fulfill their goals themselves and/or recruit allies to help them do so, that 
is only beneficial for us if their goals are positive.  Therefore, I predicted that morality 
would be highly desired, regardless of a target’s other qualities, and competence and 
sociability would be highly desired in moral others, but less desired in immoral others.  In 
this chapter, I test these two related hypotheses across five studies.   
 This theorizing extends upon earlier research that has partially explored the 
contingent desirability of competence (though not sociability).  For instance, Peeters 
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(1992) found that people preferred their friends to possess what I would call competence 
traits (e.g., industrious, quick, practical), but preferred their enemies to lack these traits.  
However, participants preferred that both their friends and their enemies possess moral 
traits (e.g., trustworthy, tolerant, conciliatory).  In another relevant study, Wojciszke, 
Bazinska, and Jaworski (1998, Study 4) found that impressions of targets with immoral 
goals were always low, but were especially low when the immoral target exhibited high 
competence.  Similarly, impressions of targets with moral goals were always positive, but 
were more positive when the targets were also competent.  These results are consistent 
with my theorizing regarding the functional role of competence.  However, in this study, 
the manipulation of competence also manipulated whether or not the target actually 
succeeded in fulfilling his or her goal or not.  For example, one description of a moral 
and competent target read, “Although himself in a hurry, Andrew stopped on his way 
seeing a helpless woman; he right away found what was wrong with her car and got it 
going using an ingenious trick.”  The information about the target’s competence (“he 
right away found what was wrong with her car and got it going using an ingenious trick”) 
is confounded with the actual outcome of the scenario (he “got it going”, thereby 
producing a beneficial outcome).  This description contrasted with the descriptions of 
moral, yet incompetent targets, who failed to produce beneficial outcomes. It is therefore 
unclear in this study whether competent, moral targets were liked more than incompetent, 
moral targets because of their competence, per se, or because of the more positive 
outcomes that they actually produced in the world.  Therefore, to test for the contingent 
role of competence more stringently, in Studies 2.1 and 2.2 I did not mention specific 
moral or immoral goals at all, but provided morality information using personality trait 
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terms; in Study 2.3, I used scenarios similar to Wojciszke et al.’s, but left the actual 
outcome unstated so as to deconfound it from my manipulation of competence; and in 
Studies 2.4 and 2.5, I used scenarios that did not focus on a specific attempted action, but 
rather provided overall characterological profiles of the target person.  In all five studies, 
I also extended this contingency hypothesis to sociability, which has only recently been 
theoretically and empirically separated from morality. 
Study 2.1 
 In Study 2.1, participants were given information about either a person’s 
sociability or competence, or about their morality, and then directly reported whether 
they would prefer the person to be high or low on traits relating to the dimension about 
which they received no information.  I predicted an interaction such that participants 
would always prefer people to possess high morality, regardless of their sociability or 
competence, but would only prefer that people possess high sociability or competence 
when they were also moral. 
Method 
 Participants. One hundred-thirteen undergraduates (70 female) were recruited 
through the University of Pennsylvania subject pool to complete an online study for 
partial course credit. 
 Procedure. The study was conducted entirely online.  After consenting to 
participate, participants were told that, “on the following pages, we will present you with 
descriptions of one aspect of a person's personality, and ask for your preference regarding 
another aspect of their personality, given this information.  For instance, a question might 
read, ‘Suppose that an acquaintance of yours has a reputation for being an EMOTIONAL 
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person.  Would you prefer that person to be OPTIMISTIC or PESSIMISTIC?’”  This 
example question was followed by a nine-point Likert scale anchored by “Strongly prefer 
OPTIMISTIC” and “Strongly prefer PESSIMISTIC,” with the midpoint labeled “I would 
be indifferent.”  A brief explanation of the scale was also provided.  This example 
question accurately reflected the format of the questions in the study, but included trait 
terms that do not strongly relate to any of the three dimensions of judgment that I was 
interested in. 
After reading the instructions and example question, participants were presented 
with 128 questions of the same form that included morality, sociability, and competence 
terms.  For each question, a morality trait was paired with either a sociability or a 
competence trait.   Thus, one variable in the design was the nature of that non-moral trait 
(sociability or competence).   A second variable was whether the moral trait was 
presented first as given information, followed by a question about participants’ 
preference for the non-moral trait in question; or alternatively, whether the non-moral 
trait was given, followed by a question about participants’ preference for the moral 
trait.  Thus, if the moral trait was given, the question might be (e.g., in the sociability 
condition): knowing that the person is moral, would you prefer that they be sociable or 
unsociable?   Whereas, if the non-moral trait was given, the question might be (e.g., in 
the sociability condition): knowing that the person is sociable, would you prefer that they 
be moral or immoral?  Finally, the third variable in the design was the valence of the 
given trait, i.e., whether the given trait was high or low on the dimension of interest (e.g., 
moral or immoral; sociable or unsociable; competent or incompetent).  Thus, the study 
had a 2 (Non-Morality Trait: sociability versus competence) by 2 (Given Trait: morality 
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versus non-morality) by 2 (Level of Given Trait: high versus low) fully within-subjects 
design (see Figure 2.1 for a schematic depiction of the design). 
There were 16 replications in each cell of the design, created by pairing four trait 
terms related to each dimension.  The morality terms were honest/dishonest, 
trustworthy/untrustworthy, moral/immoral, and principled/unprincipled, the sociability 
terms were warm/cold, sociable/unsociable, friendly/unfriendly, and 
extroverted/introverted, and the competence terms were capable/incapable, 
intelligent/unintelligent, competent/incompetent, and skillful/unskillful.  These terms were 
chosen on the basis of prior research demonstrating their relevance to the dimensions of 
interest (Chapter 1; Goodwin et al., 2014).   
Accordingly, one question in the sociability/non-morality/low condition read, 
“Suppose that an acquaintance of yours has a reputation for being an UNFRIENDLY 
person.  Would you prefer that person to be TRUSTWORTHY or 
UNTRUSTWORTHY?”  The order in which the 128 questions were presented was 
randomized for each participant.  After every 32 questions, a notification appeared that 
read “You have now completed XX% of the survey.  Thank you for your continued 
attention.”  This was included to break up the monotony of the task, and to periodically 
refocus participants’ attention.  I also counterbalanced, between-subjects, whether the 
high-trait or low-trait terms appeared first in the question and on the response scale.    
After completing the 128 questions, participants responded to a brief 
demographics questionnaire, then were debriefed and thanked.  I predicted a two-way 
interaction between Given Trait and Level of Given Trait, such that morality would 
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always be preferred, regardless of a target’s sociability or competence, but sociability and 
competence would be preferred only in moral targets. 
Results 
 Preliminary Analyses. The between-subjects manipulation of the order in which 
the high- and low-trait terms appeared showed no significant main effects or interactions, 
ps > .14, η2ps < .02, so I collapsed across this manipulation for all subsequent analyses.  
Moreover, the replications in each of the eight cells of the design all showed good 
internal reliability, αs > .93, so I averaged across the sixteen questions in each cell to 
produce one data point per within-subjects condition per participant. 
 Within-Subjects Analyses. Means and standard deviations for each condition are 
presented in Table 2.1.  I conducted a 2 (Non-Morality Trait) by 2 (Given Trait) by 2 
(Level of Given Trait) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA).  As expected, 
the critical Given Trait x Level of Given Trait interaction was found, F(1, 112) = 138.96, 
p < .001, η2p = .55.  In both the sociability and competence conditions, people preferred 
an acquaintance to be moral, regardless of whether that person was sociable or 
competent, and preferred that an acquaintance be sociable and competent, given that that 
person was moral.  But, if an acquaintance was immoral, participants showed a dramatic 
reversal in their judgments, preferring the other to be unsociable and incompetent.  All 
condition means differed significantly from the scale midpoint, ts(112) > 5.27, ps < .001, 
which indicates that people were not merely indifferent in the conditions with immoral 
targets, but actually preferred immoral others to be at least somewhat unsociable and 
incompetent.  This interaction was also observed in separate 2 (Given Trait) by 2 (Level 
of Given Trait) ANOVAs that examined the sociability and competence conditions 
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separately (sociability condition: F(1,112) = 102.12, p < .001, η2p = .48; competence 
condition: F(1, 112) = 172.99, p < .001, η2p = .54), and was therefore not driven by only 
one of these conditions.  The pattern of means is presented in Figure 2.2.  
 Returning to the main analysis, I also found a main effect of Given Trait (morality 
versus non-morality), F(1, 112) = 199.33, p < .001, η2p = .64, which reflected the fact that 
preferences for the non-given trait were, on average, lower in the morality condition than 
the non-morality condition.  This appears to be driven by the very low desirability of 
sociability and competence in immoral targets – or, to put it another way, by the overall 
greater and non-contingent desirability of morality.  There was also a main effect of 
Level of Given Trait (high versus low), F(1, 112) = 325.29, p < .001, η2p = .74, which 
reflects the fact that preferences for the non-given trait were, on average, lower when the 
target was low in the given trait.  This is, again, primarily driven by the conditions with 
immoral targets (see Figure 2).  No main effect of Non-Morality Trait (sociability versus 
competence) was observed, F (1,112) = .08, p = .78, η2p = .001. 
 I also observed a marginally significant interaction between Given Trait and Non-
Morality Trait, F(1,112) = 2.78, p = .098, η2p = .02.  This interaction is difficult to 
interpret, but the effect size indicates that it is much smaller than the other effects that I 
observed, so I consider this to be an unimportant byproduct of the high statistical power 
of this study.  There was also a significant interaction between Level of Given Trait and 
Non-Morality Trait, F(1,112) = 20.46, p < .001, η2p = .15.  This indicates that for targets 
low in the given trait, preference ratings tended to be slightly lower in the competence 
condition than in the sociability condition (Ms 5.08 and 5.37, respectively), whereas for 
targets high in the given trait, they tended to be slightly higher in the competence 
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condition than in the sociability condition (Ms 7.68 and 7.42, respectively).  This seems 
to be driven by the fact that the predicted interactive effect was slightly stronger in the 
competence condition than the sociability condition (see the effect sizes on the separate 
ANOVAs above).  Finally, I observed a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 112) = 
21.19, p < .001, η2p = .16, reflecting the stronger two-way interaction in the competence 
condition.  These additional main effects and interactions do not undermine the strength 
of my predicted interaction between Given Trait and Level of Given Trait. 
 Participant-Level Analysis. In order to probe the robustness of my result, I 
investigated how many individual participants showed the predicted pattern of results in 
their responses.  As a conservative test, I required that a participant’s average responses 
be below the scale midpoint for both low-morality targets, and above the midpoint for all 
six other targets – that is, it was not sufficient that a participant’s responses to the low-
morality targets were lower than their other responses, they had to be on the negative side 
of the scale.  Fifty-one out of 113 participants showed exactly this pattern of responses.  
Treating a participant’s responses to each of the eight conditions as independent events 
with an equal probability of falling above or below the midpoint, the probability of a 
participant showing exactly the predicted pattern by chance is equal to .58 = 1/256 = 
.00390625.  Treating each participant as a discrete event with two possible outcomes 
(match predicted pattern with probability .58, or not, with probability 1-.58), a binomial 
test shows that it is extremely unlikely that at least 51 participants showed exactly the 
predicted pattern of responses by chance, p << .001.  Similarly, when examining the 
sociability and competence conditions separately, the probability of a single participant 
showing the predicted pattern by chance is .54 = 1/16 = .0625.  Sixty participants showed 
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exactly the predicted pattern of responses in the sociability condition, and 66 in the 
competence condition.  Binomial tests show once again that the number of participants 
showing these predicted patterns is extremely unlikely to be due to chance, ps << .001.  
Not only did my predicted pattern of results obtain at the aggregate level, but a large 
proportion of the sample showed exactly the pattern of responses that I predicted. 
Discussion 
 The results of this study strongly support my hypotheses.  Moral traits were 
always seen as desirable in another person, regardless of their sociability or competence.  
However, high-sociability traits such as friendly and high-competence traits such as 
intelligent, which at first glance may appear unambiguously positive, were, in fact, only 
desired in another when the other was known to be moral.  When the other was known to 
be immoral, participants actually preferred that they lack these traits, at least to some 
degree.   
Study 2.2 
 In Study 2.1, I asked participants for their explicit preferences regarding other 
peoples’ personalities.  One possible weakness of this design is that by asking for 
preferences directly, I might be tapping people’s theories regarding what they desire in 
others, rather than how personality information actually influences their impressions of 
others.  Moreover, participants might also desire immoral targets to be unsociable and 
incompetent owing to justice considerations, rather than because these trait dimensions 
increase a person’s likelihood of goal attainment (my postulated mechanism).  
Specifically, participants might think that an immoral person does not deserve the 
benefits that come with being sociable and competent, and this could have driven their 
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responses.  Therefore, in Study 2.2, I did not ask participants for their preferences 
regarding others’ personalities.  Rather, I provided participants with information about a 
person’s morality and their sociability or competence, and asked them how positive or 
negative their overall impression of the person was.  I predicted that, consistent with 
Study 2.1, the positivity of these impressions would depend on an interaction between 
morality and sociability or competence, such that sociability and competence would 
positively predict impressions in the presence of positive morality, but would predict 
them less positively in the presence of negative morality. 
Method 
Participants. One hundred undergraduates were recruited through the University 
of Pennsylvania subject pool to complete an online study for partial course credit.  One 
did not complete the whole study, leaving a final sample of N = 99 (61 female). 
  Procedure. After consenting to participate, participants read that “On the 
following pages, we will present you with descriptions of two aspects of a person's 
personality, and ask for your overall impression of the person, given this information.”  
They were instructed to “take a moment to imagine clearly what a person who fits the 
given description would be like.  Think about how they would act, and what it would be 
like to interact with them.”  They were then presented with an example question, which 
read “What is your overall impression of someone who has the following characteristics: 
The person is EMOTIONAL and OPTIMISTIC.  My overall impression is…”, followed 
by a nine-point Likert scale ranging from “Extremely negative” to “Extremely positive”.  
As in Study 2.1, this example question accurately reflected how the questions in the study 
were formatted, but did not include traits related to the three dimensions of interest.   
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 After reading the instructions, participants were presented with 128 questions of 
this form, constituting a 2 (Level of Morality: high versus low) by 2 (Level of Non-
Morality Trait: high versus low) by 2 (Non-Morality Trait: sociability versus 
competence) fully within-subjects design with 16 replications in each cell.  These 
replications were formed by pairing the morality terms with the competence and 
sociability terms from Study 2.1.  The order of the questions was randomized for each 
participant, and I also counterbalanced whether the response scale ranged from 
“Extremely negative” to “Extremely positive”, or vice versa.  After responding to all 128 
questions, participants responded to a brief demographics questionnaire, and were 
debriefed and thanked.  I predicted a two-way interaction between Level of Morality and 
Level of Non-Morality Trait, such that sociability and competence would have a larger 
positive effect on overall impressions of moral targets than immoral targets – that is, the 
effects of sociability and competence on overall impressions should be dependent on the 
target’s morality. 
Results 
 Preliminary analyses. Responses were scored such that higher numbers indicate 
more positive impressions of the target.  The between-subjects counterbalancing of the 
response scale had no main effect, F(1, 97) = 2.94, p = .089, η2p = .029, and it did not 
interact with the other variables aside from a small, difficult-to-interpret four-way 
interaction with all three within-subjects variables, F(1,97) = 4.12, p = .045, η2p = .041.  
Although this interaction is small, I nonetheless control for this between-subjects 
manipulation in all subsequent analyses. 
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 Within-subjects analyses. Means and standard deviations for all conditions are 
presented in Table 2.2.  As can be seen in Figure 2.3, in both the sociability and 
competence conditions, impressions of moral targets were always positive and 
impressions of immoral targets were always negative.  As the Figure also shows, the 
impressions of sociable and competent targets were more complex, and contingent upon 
morality – impressions of sociable and competent targets were positive only when the 
target was also moral, and negative otherwise; similarly, impressions of unsociable and 
incompetent targets were positive if the target was also moral (and negative otherwise).  
Moreover, as expected, I observed the critical interaction between Level of Morality and 
Level of Non-Morality Trait, F(1, 97) = 123.82, p < .001, η2p = .56.  While positive 
sociability and competence made large positive contributions to impressions of moral 
targets (mean difference: 2.25 scale points), they made smaller contributions to 
impressions of immoral targets (mean difference: 1.27 scale points).  In other words, the 
“boost” one received from being sociable or competent was considerably greater for 
moral individuals than for immoral individuals.  This interaction was also found in 
separate 2x2 ANOVAs for the sociability condition, F(1, 97) = 158.31, p < .001, η2p = 
.62, and the competence condition, F(1, 97) = 56.88, p < .001, η2p = .37.   
 Returning to the main analysis, I also unsurprisingly found main effects of both 
Valence of Morality, F(1, 97) = 770.67, p < .001, η2p = .89, and Valence of Non-Morality 
Trait, F(1, 97) = 409.36, p < .001, η2p = .81, indicating that, on average, morality, 
sociability, and competence all contributed positively to global impressions.  No main 
effect of Non-Morality Trait was observed, F(1, 97) = .013, p = .91, η2p < .001.  No other 
two-way interactions were significant, ps > .13, η2ps < .024, but the three-way interaction 
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was, F(1, 97) = 14.54, p < .001, η2p = .13.  This reflects the fact that the critical two-way 
interaction was stronger in the sociability condition than in the competence condition (see 
effect sizes in above analysis). 
Discussion 
 The contingency of sociability and competence information was observed in two 
distinct ways.  Overall impressions of moral targets were always positive, and overall 
impressions of immoral targets were always negative. In contrast, targets who were high 
in sociability or competence were evaluated positively if they were also were high in 
morality, but not if they were low in morality.  Thus, while high morality produced 
positive overall impressions irrespective of other traits, sociability and competence did so 
only for moral targets.  This provides the first piece of evidence for the greater 
contingency of sociability and competence. Second, and most importantly, the positive 
contributions of sociability and competence were much smaller for immoral targets than 
for moral targets.  Sociability and competence were not valued anywhere near as much 
when possessed by immoral people (though they were still seen slightly more positively 
than unsociability and incompetence).  I did not observe the full reversal found in Study 
2.1 – that is, the effects of sociability and competence on impressions of immoral targets 
were still positive, but they were smaller than the analogous effects for moral targets.  
Nonetheless, the effects of sociability and competence were still highly dependent on a 
target’s morality, whereas morality always produced positive impressions, and 
immorality always produced negative impressions. 
Study 2.3 
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 Studies 2.1 and 2.2 clearly support my hypothesis that morality traits are generally 
seen as unambiguously desirable and positive, whereas the desirability and positivity of 
sociability and competence traits is contingent upon moral factors.  Studies 2.1 and 2.2 
showed this using abstract trait terms, but what about cases where a person’s morality 
must be inferred from his or her actions?  Presumably, in the real world, we often obtain 
information about a person’s moral character by observing their actions.  Therefore, in 
Study 2.3, I sought to replicate the results of Study 2.2 using fictional scenarios in which 
a person’s morality was indicated by their motivations and behaviors, rather than by 
abstract personality trait terms.  I also sought to show that my prior results would 
replicate in a more diverse sample than the university undergraduates who participated in 
Studies 2.1 and 2.2.  Lastly, I included a question about the likelihood that the target 
would successfully carry out his or her goal (which was either moral or immoral) to see if 
this would mediate the interactive effect of morality and sociability/competence on 
impressions. 
Method 
 Participants. Six hundred sixty-three participants were recruited online through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service in exchange for monetary compensation.  Sixteen 
failed a “Captcha” question, strongly suggesting that they were automated “bot” 
programs, and seven more failed to complete the study, leaving a final sample of N = 640 
(197 female). 
 Method. After consenting to participate, participants were randomly assigned to 
one cell of a 2 (Level of Morality: high versus low) by 2 (Level of Non-Morality Trait: 
high versus low) by 2 (Non-Morality Trait: Sociability versus Competence) between-
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subjects design.  This design is exactly analogous to that of Study 2.2, except that it is 
between-subjects rather than within-subjects.  In each condition, participants read five 
scenarios about a person attempting to accomplish a goal.  The person’s goals were either 
moral or immoral, depending on condition, but were written to be as similar in content as 
possible.  The immoral (moral) versions of the scenarios described a woman who wants 
to get a very capable coworker fired for making her look bad (wants to get a very capable 
coworker a raise), a con artist (spy) who tries to con an innocent man (warlord) out of his 
money to keep it for himself (to prevent the warlord from using it to harm civilians), a 
drug dealer (federal agent) who attempts to smuggle drugs across a border to sell them 
and make money (to establish a cover and infiltrate a drug cartel), a vice president at a 
toy company who thinks that the company should not (should) recall a toy that has been 
found to be poisonous, and a “black hat” (“white hat”) hacker attempting to break into a 
bank’s computer system to steal from the bank (to find vulnerabilities in the system and 
help the bank fix them).  Each scenario then provided information about the main 
character’s sociability or competence, depending upon condition. 
 For each scenario, participants responded to the main dependent variable, “How 
negative or positive is your overall impression of [character’s name]?”, the proposed 
mediator, “How likely do you think it is that [character’s name] succeeded in [character’s 
goal]?”, and a manipulation check, “How immoral or moral is [character’s name]?” on 
nine-point Likert scales.  The order of the dependent variable and the mediator was 
counterbalanced between-subjects, and the manipulation check was always presented 
last.  The order of the five scenarios was randomized for each participant.  After 
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responding to all five scenarios, participants completed a brief demographic 
questionnaire and were debriefed, thanked, and paid. 
Results 
 Preliminary Analyses. The five dependent variable questions and mediator 
questions both showed good internal reliability (α = .91 and α = .83, respectively), so I 
averaged them together to create one composite dependent variable and one composite 
mediator.  The morality manipulation was successful – across the five scenarios, the 
character was seen as more moral in the moral condition (M = 5.87, SD = 1.47) than in 
the immoral condition (M = 2.36, SD = 1.17), ts(638) > 16.02, ps < .001, ds > 1.26.  The 
order of question presentation showed no main effect, F(1, 624) = 2.81 p = .16, η2p = 
.003, and no significant interactions.  I therefore collapsed across this variable in all 
subsequent analyses. 
 Main Analyses. Means and standard deviations for all conditions are presented in 
Table 2.3.  As illustrated in Figure 2.4, impressions of moral individuals were always 
neutral-to-positive, while impressions of immoral individuals were always very negative.  
As in Study 2.2, however, the impressions of sociable and unsociable targets were mixed 
– impressions of sociable and competent targets were positive only when the target was 
also moral (and negative otherwise), while impressions of unsociable and incompetent 
targets were neutral if the target was moral, but negative otherwise.  Moreover, as 
predicted, the critical interaction between Valence of Morality and Valence of Non-
Morality Trait was significant, F(1, 632) = 67.70, p < .001, η2p = .070.  This interaction 
reflects the fact that high sociability or competence contributed positively to impressions 
of moral individuals, but contributed much less to impressions of immoral individuals.  
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This interaction held in both the sociability condition, F(1, 319) = 9.53, p = .002, η2p = 
.029, and the competence condition, F(1, 313) = 44.91, p < .001, η2p = .13.  These results 
replicate those found in Study 2.2. 
 Returning to the main analysis, there were main effects of Level of Morality, F(1, 
632) = 1397.25, p < .001, η2p = .69, and Level of Non-Morality Trait, F(1, 632) = 103.82, 
p < .001, η2p = .14, and no main effect of Non-Morality Trait, F(1, 632) = 2.58, p = .18, 
η2p = .003.  The two-way interactions between Level of Morality and Non-Morality Trait, 
F(1, 632) = .43, p = .51, η2p = .001, and between Level of Non-Morality Trait and Non-
Morality Trait, F(1, 632) = .99, p = .32, η2p = .002, were not significant.  The three-way 
interaction was significant, F(1, 632) = 9.19, p= .011, η2p = .01, reflecting the fact that the 
critical two-way interaction was stronger in the competence condition than in the 
sociability condition (see effect sizes above). 
 Moderated Mediation Analysis. As discussed in the Introduction, morality is, 
from a functionalist standpoint, an indicator of a person’s positive or negative intentions, 
and competence is an indicator of a person’s ability to carry out those intentions.  Thus, it 
would be expected that a person’s competence would positively predict the perceived 
likelihood that they will achieve their goals.  This perceived likelihood of success, 
should, in turn, predict one’s overall impressions of the person – that is, perceived 
likelihood of success should mediate overall impressions.  However, the direction of this 
mediation – or at least, the size of the indirect effect – should depend on the person’s 
morality.  When a person is moral, the perceived likelihood that they will achieve their 
(praiseworthy) goals should positively predict overall impressions, but when a person is 
immoral, the perceived likelihood that they will achieve their (evil) goals should less 
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positively predict overall impressions.  In other words, a person’s morality should 
moderate the mediated relationship between competence and overall impressions.  
Furthermore, as I have argued above, sociability provides information about whether a 
person is likely to be able to recruit allies to help them in pursuing their goals.  The more 
effectively one can recruit allies, the more likely one is to achieve one’s goals in the end.  
In this sense, sociability functions as a form of social competence, so the same moderated 
mediation would be expected for sociability as well.  Figure 2.5 models this relationship 
conceptually.  I tested these moderated mediation models using the PROCESS Macro for 
SPSS (Hayes, 2013), Model 14, with 10,000 bootstrap resamples for every analysis. 
 Table 2.4 presents the coefficients for each term in this analysis.  The most 
important result in Table 2.4 is the significant interaction between morality and perceived 
likelihood of success (in both the sociability and competence conditions), which indicates 
that the former is moderating the effect of the latter on overall impressions.  Furthermore, 
the indirect effect of sociability or competence on overall impressions through perceived 
likelihood of success was larger for moral targets than for immoral targets, in both the 
sociability condition (bMoral = .68, bImmoral = .28) and the competence condition (bMoral = 
1.79, bImmoral = .77, and these differences across the levels of the moderator (morality) 
were statistically significant (Sociability Condition: Index of Moderated Mediation: .40, 
95% Confidence Interval: [.04, .76]; Competence Condition: 1.02,  95% CI: [.63, 1.40]).  
In other words, the presence of sociability and competence always had a positive effect 
on overall impressions, and this was mediated through the perceived likelihood that the 
target would accomplish their goals.  However, this relationship was moderated such that 
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it was substantially weaker for immoral targets than moral targets, consistent with my 
theorizing. 
Discussion 
 Study 2.3 replicated the results of Study 2.2 using scenarios describing moral or 
immoral behaviors rather than abstract trait terms to convey targets’ morality.  Moreover, 
a conditional process analysis (Hayes, 2013) showed that the effects of sociability and 
competence on overall impressions are mediated through the perceived likelihood that a 
target will achieve his or her goals, but this mediation is moderated by the target’s 
morality, such that the indirect effect is substantially smaller for immoral targets.  In 
other words, sociability and competence increase the perceived likelihood that a person 
will achieve his or her goals, whether those goals are moral or immoral, but the effect of 
this perception on impressions depends on the person’s moral character. 
Study 2.4 
 Taken together, Studies 2.1-2.3 support my assertion that morality is always 
strongly desired in others, but sociability and competence are much less desired in 
immoral others than in moral others.  In Study 2.1, I found that the desirability of 
sociability and competence was significantly below the scale midpoint – that is, these 
traits were at least somewhat undesirable in immoral people.  However, in Studies 2.2 
and 2.3, I found that sociability and competence still contributed positively to 
impressions of immoral others, though less positively than for moral others.  This may 
have been because the descriptions of the immoral targets in Studies 2.2-2.2 were not 
especially potent (or extreme).  That is, participants may have inferred that the targets 
were not thoroughly immoral, and therefore there might still be some benefit to them 
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being sociable and competent (e.g., especially when they were not acting immorally).  
Specifically, in Study 2.2, participants may have inferred that a target described as, for 
example, “untrustworthy” was not a pathological liar, but rather a more run-of-the-mill 
person prone to white lies.  Similarly, in Study 2.3, participants may have inferred that 
the targets were doing immoral things in the given scenario, but may not have necessarily 
extrapolated that the targets were generally immoral, and therefore felt that there would 
still be some benefits to them being sociable and competent.  To address this possibility, 
in Study 2.4, I provided a general, characterological description of a target who was 
extremely immoral, and asked participants how their impression of the target would 
change if they knew that he was sociable or unsociable, competent or incompetent.  In 
this way, I kept participants’ focus on their impressions, rather than what the target 
deserves (thus avoiding the justice explanation for the results of Study 2.1), while giving 
them a thoroughly immoral target of judgment (unlike Studies 2.2 and 2.3).  I also 
included a condition in which the target was only somewhat immoral, to see if it 
produced results similar to the putatively immoral targets in Studies 2.2 and 2.3. 
Method 
 Participants. Two hundred-thirty participants were recruited through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk.  Two failed a “Captcha” question, and three more did not complete the 
survey, leaving a final sample of N = 225 (37% female). 
 Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: Very 
Immoral, Slightly Immoral, or Moral, and read a brief description of a fictional person 
that included three loosely related pieces of morality information about him.  
Specifically, the very immoral (slightly immoral) [moral] target, named “Mike,” was 
57 
 
described as extremely dishonest (slightly dishonest) [extremely honest]; as having 
completely fabricated sexual harassment charges to get a coworker fired for not 
sufficiently respecting him (as having slightly exaggerated a coworker’s slacking off to 
get him fired for not pulling his weight) [as having tried to get a very effective coworker 
a promotion]; and as having taken great pleasure in cheating on many previous girlfriends 
(as having once cheated on a previous girlfriend, and regretting it) [as having never 
cheated on a previous girlfriend, and being appalled at the very idea].   
 Participants then indicated how positive or negative their overall impression of 
Mike was, on a 100-point sliding scale, as a manipulation check.  They next indicated 
how much more positive or negative their impression would be if they knew that Mike 
possessed each of 18 different traits.  These traits constituted a 3 (sociability traits versus 
competence traits versus filler traits) by 2 (positive traits versus negative traits) design 
with three replications in each cell.  The traits were: sociable, extroverted, friendly 
(positive sociability), unsociable, introverted, unfriendly (negative sociability), 
competent, skillful, intelligent (positive competence), incompetent, unskillful, 
unintelligent (negative competence), emotional, adventurous, artistic (positive filler), 
unemotional, unadventurous, non-artistic (negative filler).  The order of presentation of 
the traits was randomized for each participant, and responses were made on nine-point 
Likert scales ranging from -4 (“much more negative”) to 4 (“much more positive”).  The 
filler traits were included to mask somewhat the aspects of personality that I was 
specifically interested in, and were not included in my analyses.  After responding to all 
18 traits, participants answered a brief demographic questionnaire, and were debriefed, 
thanked, and paid. 
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Results 
 Preliminary analyses. The manipulation of morality was successful – 
impressions of the very immoral target were extremely negative (M = 10.05, on a 0-100 
scale, SD = 17.55), impressions of the slightly immoral target were somewhat negative 
(M = 39.05, SD = 21.12), and impressions of the moral target were quite positive (M = 
86.74, SD = 18.73).  All pairwise comparisons were significant, ts > 9.12, ps < .001, ds > 
1.49. 
 The three-trait scales of positive sociability, negative sociability, positive 
competence, and negative competence all showed acceptable internal reliabilities, mean α 
= .77, range: .58-.88.  I therefore averaged responses to each three-item scale. 
 Main analyses. Participants’ responses to the questions about how their 
impression of Mike would change, given that he exhibited a given trait, were subjected to 
a 3 (Target: Very Immoral versus Slightly Immoral versus Moral) by 2 (Trait Type: 
Sociability versus Competence) by 2 (Trait Valence: Positive versus Negative) mixed-
measures ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors.  The critical 
interaction between Target and Trait Valence was observed, F(2, 222) = 20.56, p < .001, 
η2p = .16.  Means and standard deviations for each condition are presented in Table 2.4, 
and the pattern of means is graphed in Figure 2.6.  As can be seen, unsociability and 
incompetence always made impressions of a target more negative, but the effects of 
sociability and competence depended on the target’s morality.  For the very immoral 
target, positive sociability and competence both made impressions more negative, similar 
to desirability ratings in Study 2.1; for the slightly immoral target, positive sociability and 
competence both made impressions slightly more positive, similar to the impression 
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ratings in Studies 2.2 and 2.3; and, for the moral target, positive sociability and 
competence both made impressions even more positive.  Thus, the difference between 
sociable and unsociable targets, and between competent and incompetent targets grew 
larger as the target become more moral.  All means differed significantly from zero (i.e., 
no change in impression), ts > 2.90, ps < .006, ds > .33, except positive competence in 
the Very Immoral condition, the negative effect of which was marginally significant, 
t(75) = 1.82, p = .073, d = .21.  Moreover, this critical interaction was observed in both 
the sociability condition, F(2, 222) = 19.05, p < .001, η2p = .15, and the competence 
condition, F(2, 222) = 15.30, p< .001, η2p = .12. 
 Returning to the main analysis, I also observed a main effect of Target, F(2, 222) 
= 25.23, p < .001, η2p = .19, reflecting the fact that mean changes in impression were 
most positive for the moral target, less positive for the slightly immoral target, and least 
positive for the very immoral target.  I also observed a main effect of Trait Type, F(1, 
222) = 8.28, p = .004, η2p = .036, reflecting a slightly more positive average impression 
change in the competence condition, and a main effect of Trait Valence, F(1, 222) = 
199.80, p < .001, η2p = .47, reflecting the obvious fact that on average, positive terms 
produced more positive impressions, and negative terms produced more negative 
impressions.  There was no significant interaction between Target and Trait Type, F(2, 
222) = 1.33, p = .27, η2p = .012, but there was a significant interaction between Trait 
Type and Trait Valence, F(1, 222) = 13.15, p < .001, η2p = .056.  This reflects the fact 
that there was a greater overall range in impression change in the competence condition 
than in the sociability condition, i.e., positive competence terms produced, on average, 
more positive impression change than did positive sociability terms, and negative 
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competence terms produced, on average, more negative impression change than negative 
sociability terms.  No significant three-way interaction was observed, F(2, 222) = 1.00, p 
= .37, η2p = .009.  As in the previous studies, these main effects and interactions are 
largely peripheral to my hypothesis, and do not undermine the strength of the critical 
Target x Trait Valence interaction. 
Discussion 
Sociability and competence are not only more positive in moral people than 
immoral people, but they can also have a negative effect on impressions of thoroughly 
immoral individuals.  In the case of slightly immoral people, sociability and competence 
still exert positive effects, though not as strongly as they do for moral people.  These 
results further underscore the contingency of these two dimensions of person perception.  
And they also elucidate the results of Studies 2.2 and 2.3: it seems that the “immoral” 
targets used in Studies 2.2 and 2.3 were psychologically closest to the slightly immoral 
target in Study 2.4, because in both cases the effects of sociability and competence were 
slightly positive.   
The effects of positive sociability and competence did not mirror those of 
negative sociability or competence.  Instead, learning that a target was unsociable or 
incompetent had a consistent negative effect on impressions.  This means that, 
paradoxically, impressions of very immoral targets became less positive whether they 
were sociable or unsociable, competent or incompetent.  Nonetheless, my focus here is on 
the ways in which positive sociability and competence interact with morality in 
impression formation, so I leave in-depth exploration of this result to future research.  
Study 2.5 
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 Studies 2.1-2.4 have shown that the desirability and positivity of sociability and 
competence are dependent upon a target’s morality.  However, it remains plausible that 
this is true of any trait – we simply prefer that immoral people lack traits that are 
generally desirable.  As outlined above, I think that there are functional reasons why 
sociability and competence, specifically, should be contingent upon morality, but 
morality should always be seen as positive.  Thus, in this final study, I set out to 
demonstrate that, unlike sociability and competence traits, morality traits would always 
contribute positively to impressions of others.  Specifically, I manipulated what aspect of 
a target’s morality participants received information about – his honesty or his kindness – 
then provided information about the other aspect of his morality, or about his sociability 
or competence.  I expected sociability and competence to have little positive impact on 
impressions of an immoral target, but morality to have a larger positive impact, given that 
morality should always be desirable in others. 
Method 
 Participants. Two hundred fifty-six participants were recruited online through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service in exchange for monetary compensation.  Three 
failed a “Captcha” question, and three failed to complete the study, leaving a final sample 
of N = 250 (94 female). 
 Procedure. After consenting to participate, participants were randomly assigned 
to one cell of a two (Morality Information: Honesty versus Kindness) by two (Valence: 
Moral versus Immoral) between-subjects design.  As in Study 2.4, participants were 
presented with a characterological description of a person.  In the honesty condition, the 
person was described as either extremely honest or extremely dishonest, whereas in the 
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kindness condition, the person was described as either extremely kind or extremely 
unkind.  As in Study 2.4, participants rated their overall impression of the person, then 
indicated whether their impression of the person would become more positive or negative 
if the person strongly possessed each of 18 traits.  The positive and negative sociability 
and competence traits from Study 2.4 were used again here, but instead of the filler traits, 
participants were presented with three positive morality traits and three negative morality 
traits.  In the honesty condition, these traits related to kindness (kind, compassionate, 
caring, unkind, uncompassionate, uncaring), and in the kindness condition, they related 
to honesty (honest, trustworthy, sincere, dishonest, untrustworthy, insincere).  Thus, in 
each condition, participants learned about one aspect of a target’s moral character, then 
indicated how their impressions of the target would change, given positive or negative 
information about another aspect of his moral character.  The order in which the 18 trait 
terms were presented was randomized for each participant.  After responding to all 18 
traits, participants responded to a brief demographics questionnaire and were debriefed, 
thanked, and paid. 
Results 
 Preliminary analyses. The three-trait scales of positive sociability, negative 
sociability, positive competence, negative competence, positive morality, and negative 
morality showed acceptable internal reliabilities, mean α = .79, range: .55-.89.  I averaged 
responses to each three-item scale. 
 The manipulation of target morality was successful; the moral target (M = 90.86, 
SD = 10.42) elicited much more positive impressions than the immoral target (M = 11.29, 
SD = 17.19). 
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 The between-subjects manipulation of morality information (honesty versus 
kindness) showed no main effect or interactions with any other variable, ps > .20, η2ps < 
.062, so I collapsed across this variable in all subsequent analyses. 
 Main analyses.  Participants’ responses were analyzed using a 2 (Target: 
Immoral versus Moral) by 3 (Trait Type: Sociability versus Competence versus Morality) 
by 2 (Trait Valence: Positive versus Negative) mixed-measures ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last two factors, similar to the analysis in Study 2.4.  The expected three-
way interaction was found, F(2, 496) = 15.88, p < .001, η2p = .06, indicating that the 
strength of the two-way interaction between Target and Trait Valence differed by Trait 
Type.  As would be expected, this interaction was larger for morality traits (F(1, 248) = 
90.50, p < .001, η2p = .28) than for sociability traits (F( 1, 248) = 40.91, p < .001, η2p = 
.14) or competence traits (F(1, 248) = 67.60, p < .001, η2p = .21).  Inspection of Table 2.5 
and Figure 2.7 suggests that this is primarily driven by the positive morality cell in the 
Morality condition.  Indeed, consistent with my predictions, positive sociability and 
competence information had no effect on participants’ (very negative) impressions of the 
immoral target, ts(122) < 1.48, ps > .14, ds < .14, while positive morality information had 
a moderately strong positive effect on impressions of the immoral target, t(122) = 4.67, p 
< .001, d = .44.   
 Aside from the critical three-way interaction, I found main effects of Target, F(1, 
248) = 75.16, p < .001, η2p = .23, Trait Type, F(2, 496) = 17.10, p < .001, η2p = .07, and 
Trait Valence, F(1, 248) = 846.00, p < .001, η2p = .77.  I also found significant two-way 
interactions between Morality and Trait Type, F(2, 496) = 8.97, p < .001, η2p = .04, 
Morality and Trait Valence, F(1, 248) = 93.34, p < .001, η2p = .27, and Trait Type and 
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Trait Valence, F(2, 496) = 171.38, p < .01, η2p =.41.  These effects are all qualified by the 
observed three-way interaction, however. 
Discussion 
 Study 2.5 showed that positive information about one aspect of morality (honesty 
or kindness) improves impressions of people who are thoroughly lacking in other aspects 
of morality – specifically, positive information about an unkind person’s honesty and 
about a dishonest person’s kindness improved participants’ impressions of them.  
However, positive information about a target’s sociability or competence had no such 
effect.  This indicates that the contingent effects of sociability and competence found 
throughout this chapter do not generalize to any sort of trait – morality, at least, is always 
positive, but sociability and competence are not. 
General Discussion 
 Five studies showed that whereas the desirability of morality is unconditional, the 
desirability of sociability and competence in others is dependent on their morality.  In 
Study 2.1, participants always preferred that another person be moral, regardless of their 
other characteristics.  In contrast, they preferred only moral people to be sociable and 
competent, whereas they preferred immoral people to be at least somewhat unsociable 
and incompetent.  In Study 2.2, I assessed overall impressions of others with various 
qualities and found that, once again, moral people were always seen positively regardless 
of their other traits, whereas sociable and competent people were only seen positively 
when they were also moral.  Moreover, the positive effect of sociability and competence 
on impressions was considerably greater for moral targets than for immoral targets.  
Study 2.3 replicated these findings using descriptions of behavior rather than trait terms 
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to convey a target’s morality.  Study 2.3 also showed that the effect of sociability and 
competence on overall impressions is mediated through the perceived likelihood that the 
target will achieve their goals, and that the strength of this relationship is moderated by 
the target’s morality (thus revealing its contingency on morality).  In Study 2.4, I found 
that positive sociability and competence can actually have a negative effect on overall 
impressions (as opposed to an attenuated positive effect), when a person is extremely 
immoral.  In Study 2.5, I provided further support for my claim that positive morality is 
always desirable by showing that positive morality information improves impressions of 
even thoroughly immoral people, whereas positive sociability and competence 
information do not.  This indicates that the contingent effects of sociability and 
competence do not generalize to all types of traits. 
 These results are consistent with the functionalist account outlined above.  Insofar 
as morality informs us about another’s likely intentions toward us, we should always 
prefer that other people be moral, regardless of their other qualities: if another person has 
positive intentions toward us, rather than negative ones, this will produce better outcomes 
for us under nearly any circumstance.  However, both competence and sociability inform 
us about the likelihood that a person will fulfill those intentions, though in different ways 
– competence informs us whether they are likely to fulfill their goals themselves, while 
sociability informs us whether they are likely to be able to recruit others to help them.  
Given that we should prefer that people with immoral intentions not fulfill them, we 
should consider sociability and competence to be less positive in such people, and 
perhaps even somewhat negative. 
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 One unexpected result was that the strength of the predicted interaction 
sometimes differed between the sociability condition and the competence condition.  The 
interaction was larger in the sociability condition in Study 2.2, but larger in the 
competence condition in Studies 2.1 and 2.3, and there was no significant difference in 
the size of this effect across conditions in Study 2.4 (though the effect was directionally 
larger in the sociability condition).  Because I did not observe any consistent pattern, I 
suspect that any difference in the size of this effect across conditions is due to random 
variability.  Neither competence nor sociability seems to be considered more dependent 
on morality with any consistency. 
 My results align with the findings of Wojciszke et al. (1998) and with prior theory 
regarding competence.  They extend upon this work by showing that sociability, which 
has often been treated as part of the same superordinate dimension of judgment as 
morality, is actually thought about very differently from morality. Sociability is, in fact, 
only contingently desirable, because it depends on a person’s morality.  These results 
therefore offer further support for the claim that morality and sociability are separate 
dimensions of person perception, rather than highly related subcomponents of one 
superordinate dimension (e.g., Fiske et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 2002), as argued in Chapter 
1.  If both morality and sociability were components of the same dimension of judgment, 
one would expect them to be processed in similar ways when forming impressions of 
others.  Yet my results consistently showed an interactive effect, whereby morality is 
always desired and seen as positive, but sociability is only desired in the presence of 
morality.  This shows a striking divergence in how people use information about these 
qualities in others when forming impressions, and strongly suggests that they are not part 
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of the same dimension of evaluation in real judgments.  Not only do they not cohere in 
judgments of others, they contribute in very different ways to such judgments. 
 More broadly, these results speak to the complexity of human social judgment.  It 
is clear that additive linear models cannot fully capture the richness and contingencies of 
how we think about others in our social worlds.  Instead, trait dimensions interact in quite 
subtle ways to produce overall impressions.  However, my results also provide further 
evidence that one trait dimension in particular is primary: when it comes to forming 
impressions, and probably most of social cognition, morality information is dominant, 
and plays a large role in coloring how we interpret everything else. 
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Figure 2.1. Summary of Study 2.1 Design.  Information in bold was provided to 
participants; dependent variables are presented in italics. 
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Figure 2.2. Mean preference ratings in Study 2.1. 
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Table 2.2. Means and standard deviations for all conditions in Study 2.2. 
Other Trait Level of Morality Level of Non-Morality Trait M SD 
Sociability High (Moral) High (Sociable) 2.59 .98 
  Low (Unsociable) 0.27 .95 
 Low (Immoral) High (Sociable) -1.4 1.09 
  Low (Unsociable) -2.56 1.07 
Competence High (Moral) High (Competent) 2.56 .93 
  Low (Incompetent) 0.37 1.13 
 Low (Immoral) High (Competent) -1.34 1.14 
  Low (Incompetent) -2.71 1.08 
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Figure 2.3. Positivity of overall impressions in Study 2.2. 
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Table 2.3. Means and standard deviations from Study 2.3.  
Other Trait Level of Morality Level of Other Trait M SD 
Sociability High (Moral) High (Sociable) 1.41 1.33 
  Low (Unsociable) 0.14 1.14 
 Low (Immoral) High (Sociable) -2.45 1.32 
  Low (Unsociable) -2.9 .94 
Competence High (Moral) High (Competent) 1.94 1.17 
  Low (Incompetent) -0.01 1.22 
 Low (Immoral) High (Competent) -2.53 1.20 
  Low (Incompetent) -2.69 1.13 
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Figure 2.4. Positivity of overall impressions in Study 2.3. 
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Figure 2.5. Moderated mediation models for the sociability and competence conditions 
in Study 2.3.  The target’s sociability or competence predicts the perceived likelihood 
that they will achieve their goals, which in turn predicts one’s overall impression of the 
target.  This latter relationship is moderated by the target’s morality. 
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Table 2.4. Coefficients of moderated mediation models in Study 2.3, with upper and 
lower limits of bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.   
Sociability Condition 
Predictor Variable Outcome Variable Coefficient LL UL 
Level of sociability Likelihood of success 1.99* 1.72 2.27 
Level of sociability Overall impression .37* .03 .72 
Likelihood of success Overall impression .14 -.004 .28 
Morality Overall impression 3.26* 2.96 3.56 
Morality x Likelihood Overall impression .20* .03 .37 
     
Competence Condition 
Predictor Variable Outcome Variable Coefficient LL UL 
Level of competence Likelihood of success 2.92* 2.66 3.18 
Level of competence Overall impression -.26 -.65 .14 
Likelihood of success Overall impression .26* .13 .39 
Morality Overall impression 3.47* 3.22 3.72 
Morality x Likelihood Overall impression .35* .22 .48 
 
Note: Exact p-values were not computed in the bootstrap analysis; asterisks indicate 
coefficients for which the 95% confidence interval does not contain zero.  LL = Lower 
Limit; UL = Upper Limit 
  
77 
 
Table 2.5. Means and standard deviations in Study 2.4. 
Condition Trait Type Trait Valence M (reported 
change in 
impressions) 
SD 
Very Immoral Sociability Positive (Sociable) -.43 1.28 
  Negative (Unsociable) -.99 1.10 
 Competence Positive (Competent) -.28 1.35 
  Negative (Incompetent) -1.07 1.32 
Slightly Immoral Sociability Positive (Sociable) .46 .94 
  Negative (Unsociable) -.82 1.09 
 Competence Positive (Competent) .72 1.20 
  Negative (Incompetent) -.89 1.39 
Moral Sociability Positive (Sociable) 1.02 .89 
  Negative (Unsociable) -1.00 .79 
 Competence Positive (Competent) 1.47 1.14 
  Negative (Incompetent) -1.13 1.16 
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Figure 2.6. Change in overall impressions in Study 2.4, by target morality and type of 
trait information. 
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Table 2.6. Means and standard deviations from Study 2.5. 
Target Trait Type Trait Valence M (reported 
change in 
impressions) 
SD 
Immoral Sociability Positive (Sociable) .09 .99 
  Negative (Unsociable) -1.11 1.12 
 Competence Positive (Competent) .15 1.10 
  Negative 
(Incompetent) 
-1.87 1.57 
 Morality Positive (Moral) .53 1.26 
  Negative (Immoral) -2.10 1.57 
Moral Sociability Positive (Sociable) 1.24 .98 
  Negative (Unsociable) -1.21 .86 
 Competence Positive (Competent) 2.05 1.20 
  Negative 
(Incompetent) 
-2.07 1.14 
 Morality Positive (Moral) 2.46 1.12 
  Negative (Immoral) -2.66 1.14 
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Figure 2.7. Change in overall impressions in Study 2.5, by target morality and type of 
trait information. 
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COMPETENCE IS NOT ALWAYS THE MOST VALUED ASPECT OF THE SELF 
 Thus far, I have shown that judgments of morality do not cohere with judgments 
of sociability or competence (Chapter 1), that judgments of morality, sociability, and 
competence differently predict intergroup emotions (Chapter 1), and that the perceived 
desirability and positivity of sociability and competence depend on a target’s morality, 
whereas morality is always considered to be positive and desirable (Chapter 2).  I turn 
now to the question of how these dimensions of judgment are applied to the self, and, 
specifically, what evaluative dimension(s) is most highly valued in the self.  It is 
seemingly accepted among social cognition researchers that people primarily value 
morality in others, but primarily value competence in the self.  In this chapter, I apply a 
novel methodological approach to this question, and show that competence is not always 
the most valued aspect of the self – under some circumstances, morality may be at least 
as important, if not somewhat more so. 
Competence, Morality, and the Self 
 Wojciszke (2005) summarizes an extensive program of research examining how 
morality and competence are processed with respect to the self and others.  One of his 
central theses is that competence is directly self-profitable.  That is, regardless of one’s 
goals, it is better for the self to pursue them efficiently and skillfully.  Conversely, 
morality is primarily other-profitable, in that others are the primary beneficiaries of one’s 
moral actions (and are the ones harmed by one’s immoral actions).  Therefore, 
competence ought to be more valued than morality in the self, whereas morality ought to 
be more valued than competence in others. 
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Several empirical findings support this theoretical assertion.  Wojciszke (1994) 
showed that people tend to construe their own actions in terms of competence or 
incompetence (i.e., success or failure), but tend to construe others’ actions in terms of 
morality or immorality (i.e., in terms of intentions).  This held true whether participants 
were asked to imagine hypothetical events from either the actor or observer perspective, 
or if they recalled real events from their past.  Moreover, when participants recall acts 
from their past, negative competence-related acts (i.e., failures) produce more extreme 
negative emotion than do negative morality-related acts (i.e., transgressions).  Similarly, 
recalling positive competence-related acts (i.e., successes) produces more extreme 
positive affect than recalling positive morality-related acts (i.e., norm-maintaining 
behaviors or supererogatory acts; Wojciszke & Dowhyluk, 2003).  Relatedly, Abele and 
Wojciszke (2007) found that people would rather improve their own “agentic” (i.e., 
competence) skills (time management and persuading an audience) than their 
“communal” (i.e., moral) skills (giving social support and moral self-development), 
suggesting that the agentic skills are more valued in the self. 
Finally, in perhaps the most direct demonstration that competence is more valued 
in the self than morality, it has been shown that the extent to which one ascribes moral 
traits to one’s self is only weakly and inconsistently predictive of one’s self-esteem – as 
measured in various ways – whereas the extent to which one ascribes competence traits to 
the self robustly predicts self-esteem (Wojciszke et al., 2011).  Importantly, this result 
was not explainable as a statistical artifact due to ceiling effects or restriction of range. 
However, morality is thought to be a highly important aspect of many people’s 
identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002), and people will often incur substantial personal costs to 
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maintain an image of themselves as moral individuals.  For example, people will 
frequently cheat to earn rewards when the risk of detection is minimal, but only to a fairly 
small extent – in other words, they will forego a considerable amount of easily-obtained 
money to maintain an image of the self as (relatively) honest (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 
2008).  How can these findings be reconciled with the above results that seem to indicate 
that morality is not highly valued in the self?  I propose that it is not that people do not 
value their morality, but rather, that they do not usually doubt it. 
There may be many reasons why people would be generally more secure that they 
are highly moral than that they are highly competent.  First, people generally receive 
quite a bit of feedback regarding their competence, be it exam grades, annual 
performance reviews, or meetings with their dissertation committees.  Due to this 
preponderance of feedback from their social worlds, most people probably receive, at 
least on occasion, negative feedback about their competence, leading to a belief that they 
could do better.  On the other hand, feedback about morality may be fairly uncommon.  
Criminal and civil court proceedings might qualify, but these typically pertain to fairly 
extreme failures in moral behavior – feedback about one’s everyday morality may not be 
an especially common feature of our social worlds.  Moreover, the feedback we do 
receive regarding our morality may be less objective than that we receive regarding our 
competence.  Most competence measures are, at least in theory, fairly objective – wins 
and losses, grades, and so on, whereas any feedback that we do receive about our 
morality – say, through gossip in our social groups, may be seen as more subjective. 
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Lastly, it may be easier to reconstrue failures of morality than failures of 
competence in service of protecting one’s self-concept.  As noted, feedback about failures 
of competence tends to be direct and fairly objective – one either does or does not win the 
game, or pass the test, or secure the new account.  On the other hand, it appears to be 
quite simple to reconstrue immoral behavior as morally irrelevant or “not that bad,” 
thereby maintaining a moral self-concept, even when committing behaviors that would 
typically be considered immoral, especially if the behavior is committed in private, and 
thus is not subject to feedback from others (Mazar et al., 2008).  Thus, people may be 
generally more secure in their own moral excellence than their own supreme competence.  
Indeed, the well-known better-than-average effect appears to be larger for moral traits 
than competence traits (Brown, 2012).  This would explain why, for instance, people 
would prefer to improve their agentic/competence skills over their communal/moral skills 
– as far as most people are concerned, they probably have little to no room to improve 
their morality anyway. 
Thus, it could be the case that people do value their own morality as much or 
more than they value their own competence, but they are more certain of their good moral 
character than their high competence, and therefore react more negatively to discrete 
failures of competence than morality, and wish to improve their competence rather than 
their morality.  This possibility generates a novel prediction: when people’s morality is 
credibly threatened, they should react at least as negatively – if not more so – as when 
their competence is credibly threatened.  That is, if their confidence in their morality is 
shaken, they should show signs of valuing it highly.  Participants’ emotional reactions to 
threats to different aspects of their selves has not, to my knowledge, been used previously 
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as a way to measure the importance of those aspects.  Therefore, in three studies, I 
presented participants with hypothetical or real threats to their morality, competence, or 
sociability, and measured their emotional responses.  I predicted that participants would 
react at least as negatively to threats to their morality as to threats to their competence, if 
not more so.  Although the primary comparison of interest in these studies is between 
threats to morality and competence, I also included threats to sociability for exploratory 
purposes. 
Study 3.1 
 As a preliminary demonstration that competence is not always valued more in the 
self than morality, I had participants imagine that a group of their friends had impugned 
either their morality, their competence, their sociability, or both their morality and their 
sociability (using “blended” traits, as in Study 1.3), and then rate how they would feel 
using a variety of emotion terms.  I hypothesized that participants would be at least as 
upset by challenges to their morality as by challenges to their competence. 
Method 
 Participants. Three hundred-eight participants located in the United States were 
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk.  Four did not complete the survey, leaving a 
final sample of N = 304.  The sample was 45% female and represented a diverse range of 
ages (M = 32.09 years, SD = 9.97). 
 Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: 
Morality, Competence, Sociability, or Morality/Sociability.  In each condition, 
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participants read a short vignette in which they overheard a group of friends say negative 
things about them.  For example, in the Morality condition, the vignette read: 
Suppose you were at a social event hosted which several of your friends are attending. 
  
Imagine that during this social event, you overhear a group of your friends talking about 
you.  You hear one of them say that they consider you to be an untrustworthy and 
unprincipled person, and you see the rest of the group nodding and agreeing. 
 
 In the Sociability condition, “untrustworthy and unprincipled” was replaced with 
“rude and disagreeable”, in the Competence condition, with “irrational and incompetent”, 
and in the Morality/Sociability condition, with “unhelpful and selfish.”  These traits were 
selected from a prior norming study (Goodwin et al., 2014, Study 1), in which nine 
groups of participants rated different sets of trait terms on their overall valence (and 
several other dimensions).  The eight terms used in this study were each evaluated by a 
different group of participants, creating a 4 (Condition: Morality, Sociability, 
Competence, Morality/Sociability) by 2 (Two trait terms per condition) between-subjects 
design.  The mean valence in each condition was, unsurprisingly, quite low (Morality: 
2.12, Sociability: 2.36, Competence: 2.11, Morality/Sociability: 2.16, on nine-point 
scales), and did not differ between conditions, F(3, 828) = .60, p = .62.  The 
Morality/Sociability condition was added precisely because the terms in the Sociability 
condition were slightly less extreme in their valence than the Morality and Competence 
conditions.  That is, the only way to create something like a Sociability condition that 
contained traits that were as evaluatively extreme as in the Morality and Competence 
conditions, was to use “blended” Morality/Sociability traits. 
 After reading the vignette, participants responded to a series of questions, all of 
the form “How shocked would you feel?” on nine-point Likert scales.  In addition to how 
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“shocked” they would feel, participants also indicated how “hurt”, “angry”, “irritated”, 
“offended”, and “insulted” they would feel.  The order of presentation of the six 
questions was randomized for each participant.  After responding to all six questions, 
participants responded to a brief demographic questionnaire, and were debriefed, 
thanked, and paid. 
Results and Discussion 
 Principal components analysis of participants’ responses to the six questions 
revealed only one factor, explaining 68.94% of the variance in responses, and all six 
questions loaded quite highly on this factor (range: .74 to .90).  Moreover, the six 
questions showed very high internal reliability, α = .91.  Therefore, I averaged responses 
to all six questions together to produce one composite dependent variable. 
 This composite variable was then analyzed using a one-way ANOVA with four 
conditions.  The effect of condition trended toward significance, F(3, 300) = 1.97, p = 
.14, , η2p = .02.  As expected, participants showed the most negative responses in the 
Morality condition (M = 7.60 SD = 1.46).  Their responses were less negative – though 
still quite negative overall, as one might expect – in the Sociability condition (M = 7.29, 
SD = 1.43), the Competence condition (M = 7.17, SD = 1.51), and the 
Morality/Sociability condition (M = 7.05, SD = 1.64).  This last finding was somewhat 
unexpected.  Given my hypothesis that morality is highly central to the self, I would 
expect very negative reactions to being called “unhelpful and selfish”.  Nonetheless, the 
purely moral traits “untrustworthy and unprincipled” elicited more negative reactions 
than the competence traits “irrational and incompetent,” consistent with my hypothesis. 
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 I next examined responses to each of the six dependent variables in separate one-
way ANOVAs.  Descriptive and inferential statistics can be found in Table 3.1.  Briefly, 
participants in the Morality condition showed the most negative emotional response to all 
six questions, a pattern which was statistically significant for the “angry” and “offended” 
questions.  Thus, participants consistently reacted most negatively to threats to their 
morality, though this effect was small and not always statistically reliable.  Therefore, in 
Study 3.2, I attempted to replicate the effect. 
Study 3.2 
Method 
 Participants. Three hundred-seven participants located within the United States 
were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk.  Three did not complete the survey, 
leaving a final sample of N = 304.  The sample was 35% female and represented a diverse 
range of ages (M = 30.94 years, SD = 9.37). 
 Procedure. The procedure was very similar to Study 3.1.  The vignette that 
participants read was modified slightly, such that in the Morality condition, it now read: 
Suppose you were at a social event that several of your friends are attending. 
  
Imagine that during this social event, you overhear a group of your friends talking about 
you.  You hear one of them, whom you consider to be a close friend of yours, say that 
they consider you to be an untrustworthy and unprincipled person, and you see the rest of 
the group nodding and agreeing.   
 
The vignettes in the Sociability, Competence, and Morality/Sociability conditions 
were identical, except for the fact that different trait terms were substituted in place of 
“untrustworthy and unprincipled,” exactly as in Study 3.1.  After reading the vignette, 
participants indicated on nine-point Likert scales how “angry”, “offended”, and 
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“betrayed” they would feel.  I included “angry” and “offended” because these showed the 
clearest differentiation between conditions in Study 3.1, and added “betrayed” because it 
was a previously unused term that seemed to capture the central thrust of the event 
described in the vignette.  The order of presentation of the three questions was 
randomized for each participant.  After responding to all three questions, participants 
completed a short demographics questionnaire and were debriefed, thanked, and paid.   
Results and Discussion 
 Principal components analysis of the three dependent variables retained one 
factor, accounting for 81.54% of the variance in responses.  The three questions all 
loaded highly on this factor (range: .89-.92) and showed good internal reliability, α = .89, 
so I again collapsed the three questions into one composite dependent variable. 
 I analyzed this composite variable using a one-way ANOVA with four conditions.  
There was a significant effect of condition, F(3, 300) = 3.47, p = .017, η2p = .034.  As in 
Study 3.1, participants had the most negative reaction when their morality was challenged 
(M = 7.75, SD = 1.20).  Follow-up between-subjects t-tests indicated that their reactions 
were significantly lower in the Sociability (M = 6.94, SD = 1.46, t(151) = 3.75, p < .001, 
d = .61), Competence (M = 7.22, SD = 1.78, t (150) = 2.11, p = .036, d = .34), and 
Morality/Sociability (M = 7.21, SD = 1.83, t(149) = 2.12, p = .036, d = .34) conditions.  
However, Tukey’s HSD test indicated that only the Morality-Sociability difference was 
significant (p = .009; Morality-Competence: p = .18, Morality-Morality/Sociability: p = 
.17). 
 I next separately analyzed each dependent variable, to examine whether these 
results were consistent among them.  Descriptive and inferential statistics can be found in 
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Table 3.2.  Briefly, participants showed the most negative reactions when their morality 
was threatened for all three questions.  The overall ANOVA was significant for the 
“angry” and “betrayed” questions, and marginally significant for the “offended” question. 
 Thus, this study replicated the pattern of results from Study 3.1.  When 
participants imagined that a close other impugned an aspect of their personality, they 
were most upset when that aspect was their morality, rather than their competence or 
their sociability.  This effect was somewhat more reliable in this study, though still not 
always statistically significant.  Nonetheless, the result is quite consistent across the two 
studies.  Indeed, when the data are combined from the two studies, the overall ANOVAs 
on the “angry” and “offended” questions – the only questions shared between the two 
studies – are both significant (F(3, 604) = 5.72, p = .001, η2p = .028 and F(3, 604) = 3.77, 
p = .011, η2p = .018, respectively).  Tukey’s HSD test found that responses to the 
Morality condition differed significantly from the Sociability and Morality/Sociability 
condition for both questions, ps < .03, but did not differ from the Competence condition 
for either question, ps > .30.  Overall, then, it seems that morality is at least as valued in 
the self as competence, if not somewhat more so.  In Study 3.3, I replicate this effect 
again using a psychologically real challenge to participants’ morality, rather than 
hypothetical scenarios. 
Study 3.3 
 Two criticisms might be leveled at Studies 3.1 and 3.2.  First, because these 
studies employed hypothetical scenarios, participants never felt any actual threat to a 
valued aspect of the self.  Therefore, similar to Study 2.1, these studies may have been 
tapping participants’ theories about what they value (or what they should value) in 
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themselves, rather than what they actually value.  To address this, in Study 3.3 I created a 
psychologically real challenge to participants’ morality, sociability, or competence by 
giving them negative false feedback from a bogus psychological assessment.  In this way, 
participants were led to believe, briefly, that they were quite low in morality, sociability, 
or competence, compared to their peers, creating a real psychological threat, rather than a 
hypothetical one. 
 Second, the dependent variables used in Studies 3.1 and 3.2 were somewhat ad 
hoc, and were not derived from any psychometrically validated emotional assessment.  
Therefore, in Study 3.3, I measured participants’ emotional reactions to the false 
feedback using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form (PANAS-X; 
Watson & Clark, 1994).  The PANAS-X expands the original PANAS (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) beyond measures of general positive and negative affect to also include 
scales measuring various discrete emotional states.  The PANAS-X thus provides a more 
nuanced assessment of participants’ emotional states.  Because threats to morality and 
competence may elicit different emotional responses, obtaining this level of nuance 
seemed worth the length of the task (60 questions). 
Method 
 Participants.  One hundred thirty-six participants were recruited from the 
University of Pennsylvania subject pool in exchange for partial course credit.  Because 
the false feedback in this experiment could cause some distress in participants, the 
recruitment materials specified that that no participant could have any history of mental 
illness or emotional disturbance, and the research assistant confirmed this with every 
participant upon arrival at the lab.  Three participants were entirely excluded from all 
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analyses – two due to an error in the experimental procedure, and one due to being 
visibly intoxicated during the study.  This left a final sample of N = 133 undergraduates 
(88 female). 
 Procedure. Participants arrived at the lab in groups of up to five, and, upon 
arrival, were seated in individual cubicles and were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions: Morality, Sociability, or Competence.  After giving informed consent, they 
completed the PANAS-X, indicating the extent to which they felt each of 60 emotion 
terms “right now.”  The 60 terms were presented in one of two randomized orders.  After 
completing the PANAS-X, they were given a “personality assessment” consisting of ten 
questions.  The questions took a variety of forms based loosely on various stimuli that 
have been used across different areas of psychology, including the Heinz dilemma, the 
prisoner’s dilemma, and the Thematic Apperception Test.  The exact questions varied by 
condition but were roughly consistent in the forms that they took.  In each condition, the 
questions focused on words and behaviors related to the personality dimension to be 
threatened (morality, sociability, or competence).  After participants completed the bogus 
assessment, the research assistant running the study collected the assessments and left the 
room to “score” them.  In the interim, participants were given a word completion task to 
work on (derived from the dependent variable utilized by Anderson, Carnagey, & 
Eubanks, 2003). 
 After five minutes, the research assistant returned and gave participants a “results 
sheet” from their “personality assessment.”  It briefly presented as fact the (fictional) 
history of the assessment, which was identified as the “Stanford-Grey Short-Form 
Morality Assessment” (or “Sociability Assessment” or “Competence Assessment”).  It 
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explained that the test assesses how well a person can be described by several trait terms 
(which differed by condition), and that it correlates well with real-world behavior.  
Participants were then told that, based on their results, they are more moral (or sociable, 
or competent) than 36% of other people, and less so than 64% of other people.  These 
numbers were selected because they indicate that the participant is well below average, 
but seem at least somewhat plausible.1  The sheet was designed to look like a 
standardized form on which the research assistant had hand-written these numbers.  In 
reality, all participants received the same feedback.  The full text of the bogus 
assessments and the results sheets can be found in Appendix B. 
After reading over the results sheet, participants again completed the PANAS-X, 
this time with the 60 emotion words presented in a different randomized order (i.e., the 
order that the participant did not receive previously).  Participants then completed a brief 
demographics questionnaire, and answered two open-ended questions about the study: 
“What was your reaction to the results of the personality assessment?” and “Did you 
notice anything strange or suspicious about any part of the experiment?”   Finally, they 
were fully debriefed and thanked.  In particular, it was stressed that the personality test 
and the accompanying results were entirely fabricated. 
By having participants complete the PANAS-X twice, I could examine how the 
false feedback changed participants’ emotional states. 
Results and Discussion 
 Thirty-five participants indicated in their open-ended responses that they thought 
that the personality test was fake, or that it was intended to affect their mood.  Because 
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the threat to these participants was not psychologically real to them, they were excluded 
from analysis, though the reported results remain largely unchanged if they are included.2 
 Analyses were conducted on the change in participants’ endorsement of the 60 
emotion terms from prior to the personality assessment to after receiving the false 
feedback. The PANAS-X consists of two subscales that measure general positive and 
negative affect, and eleven subscales that measure more discrete emotional states, so I 
averaged the change scores for the emotion terms that comprise each subscale.  Table 3.3 
shows the mean change on each scale in each condition. 
 As can be seen in Table 3.3, participants showed the greatest increase in negative 
affect, hostility, and surprise, and the greatest reduction in self-assurance, attentiveness, 
and serenity, when their competence was threatened.  However, they showed the greatest 
increase in guilt and sadness, and the greatest reduction in positive affect and joviality 
when their morality was threatened.  Participants also showed the largest absolute change 
in fear when their morality was threatened, but this effect was extremely small, and the 
change was essentially zero in all three conditions.  One-way ANOVAs comparing the 
three conditions were significant only for the guilt and sadness subscales.  Tukey’s HSD 
found that the morality and sociability conditions differed significantly on the guilt 
subscale, p = .023, and nearly significantly on the sadness scale, p = .054, but all other 
pairwise comparisons were nonsignficant, ps > .07.  Overall, these results show that 
participants did not always react most negatively to threats to their competence, 
suggesting that competence is not always the most valued aspect of the self.  Instead, 
morality and competence both appear to be highly valued, and challenges to them elicit 
different, but comparably negative, emotional reactions. 
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 Overall, challenges to sociability tended to produce less emotion change than 
challenges to competence or morality.  However, challenges to sociability did produce 
the largest observed reductions in shyness and fatigue.  The former result may be a sort of 
motivated response to being told that one is not sociable – participants may have wanted 
to go socialize to prove to themselves that they were not as withdrawn as their test results 
suggested.  The latter result is more difficult to explain, but may be due to a similar effect 
– socializing requires actively engaging with others, and therefore requires one to have 
the energy necessary to do so.  Being motivated to socialize may have increased 
participants’ energy and alertness.  The overall ANOVA comparing the three conditions 
on the fatigue scale was significant, and Tukey’s HSD showed that the morality and 
sociability conditions differed significantly from one another, p = .044, but there was no 
significant difference between the morality and competence conditions, p = .13, or the 
sociability and competence conditions, p = 90. 
General Discussion 
 In this chapter, three studies presented participants with hypothetical and real 
threats to their morality, competence, or sociability, and examined their emotional 
reactions.  When hypothetically threatened, Americans in two online samples (Studies 3.1 
and 3.2) showed the most negative reactions to threats to their morality.  When university 
undergraduates were presented with a (psychologically) real threat, they reacted 
negatively to threats to both competence and morality (and, to some extent, sociability), 
but showed different patterns of emotional reactions depending on what aspect of the self 
was threatened.  These studies show that competence is not always the most valued 
aspect of the self – morality seems to be very highly valued as well, and which one is 
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more valued may depend considerably on the circumstances, or on how “value” is 
measured. 
Discrepant Results 
 One important difference between the results of Studies 3.1 and 3.2 deserves 
mention.  In Studies 3.1 and 3.2, participants always showed the strongest negative 
emotional reaction to threats to their morality, rather than their competence.  However, in 
Study 3.3, participants showed highly negative – though distinct – reactions to threats to 
both their morality and their competence.  There are at least three (non-exclusive) 
explanations for this apparent discrepancy.  The first is the nature of the dependent 
measures.  In Studies 3.1 and 3.2, I examined only a small number of emotional states, 
whereas in Study 3.3, I examined a wide variety.  It could be that the emotional states 
used as dependent variables in Studies 3.1 and 3.2 happen to be states that are primarily 
associated with threats to morality, rather than competence.  However, I consider this 
explanation to be unlikely.  Many of the emotion terms used in Studies 3.1 and 3.2 
resemble the hostility subscale of the PANAS-X (e.g., angry, irritated, offended, 
insulted), and one is closely related to the surprise subscale (i.e., shocked).  In Study 3.3, 
hostility and surprise were more associated with threats to competence than to morality.   
There is a more plausible explanation, I think, that relates to the different sample 
employed in Study 3.3.  Specifically, Study 3.3 sampled university undergraduates, a 
population immersed in an environment that heavily emphasizes competence.  Thus, our 
sample in Study 3.3 may have generally valued their competence more than our samples 
in Studies 3.1 and 3.2.  A third possible explanation has to do with the source of the 
threat – in Studies 3.1 and 3.2, the threat came from a close friend of the participant, 
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whereas in Study 3.3, it came from a previously unknown experimenter – or, more 
accurately, from a psychological assessment.  Participants may have felt that a close 
conspecific is more qualified to judge their morality, whereas a psychological researcher 
may be more qualified to assess their competence, accounting for the more negative 
reactions to competence threats in Study 3.3 than the previous studies.  Of course, it is 
important to keep in mind that the threats in Studies 3.1 and 3.2 were merely 
hypothetical, whereas the threats in Study 3.3 were thought by participants to be real, so 
any conclusions about a direct comparison between the results of the studies must 
necessarily be tentative. 
I have proposed that prior results seemed to show that competence is almost 
universally more valued in the self than morality because people are generally more 
secure in their morality than their competence.  However, in Study 3.3, participants 
showed greater surprise in response to credible threats to their competence than to their 
morality.  If negative feedback about one’s competence is less expected than negative 
feedback about one’s morality, this would suggest that people are actually more secure in 
their competence than their morality.  Why might this be?  Once again, the answer may 
be related to the nature of the sample in Study 3.3.  The participants in this study were not 
just undergraduates at any university, they were undergraduates at a very prestigious, 
elite university.  They presumably all performed very well in high school, and have 
probably spent much of their lives receiving positive feedback about their competence.  
Thus, they may be more secure in their competence than members of the population at 
large.  An important direction for future research is to see whether surprise is associated 
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more with competence threats or morality threats in a more representative sample.  Based 
on my theorizing, I would expect it to be primarily associated with morality threats. 
Connection to Other Research 
 The results of these three studies also shed additional light on the relationship 
between morality and sociability.  I have previously shown that judgments of the morality 
and sociability of other people and groups do not strongly cohere, and that sociability is 
primarily desired in moral others.  The three studies reported in this chapter suggest that 
morality (and competence) is generally more valued in the self than sociability, insofar as 
emotional reactions tended to be less extreme when one’s sociability, rather than 
morality, was threatened.  Moreover, Study 3.3 suggests that threats to one’s morality and 
sociability are associated with different types of emotional reactions – threats to morality 
led to feelings of guilt and sadness, and reductions in positive affect and joviality, 
whereas threats to sociability produced reductions in shyness and fatigue.  This is yet 
another dissociation in how these two dimensions of judgment are processed, and one 
more piece of evidence that they are not especially closely related to one another 
psychologically. 
Conclusion 
 In sum, this research challenges the idea that competence is generally a more 
valued aspect of the self than is morality.  Morality seems to be at least as valued as 
competence in general, and whether one is valued over the other at any given time is 
likely to be highly dependent on the situation.  Moreover, threats to morality and 
competence appear to be associated with different types of negative reactions, with 
morality threats producing sadness and guilt, and competence threats producing hostility 
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(and, perhaps, surprise).  Moreover, threats to morality and sociability also appear to be 
associated with different emotional responses, again showing that these dimensions of 
judgment are processed quite differently.  Overall, these three studies provide a more 
nuanced picture than prior research of how three important dimensions of social 
cognition are applied to the self. 
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Footnotes 
1 In an early version of this study, participants were told that they were more 
moral (or sociable or competent) than 19% of other people, and less so than 81% of other 
people.  I quickly abandoned this version, because participants almost universally refused 
to accept the false feedback and recognized that it was probably fabricated.  This was less 
common in the final version of the study, though it did occur in some instances (see 
Results section). 
2 Two minor changes are observed if these participants are included: the overall 
ANOVA on the sadness subscale becomes nonsignficant, and Sociability, rather than 
Morality, shows the largest effect on the fear subscale. 
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Table 3.3. Mean change in endorsement of 13 PANAS-X subscales and inferential 
statistics from Study 3.3.   
PANAS-X Subscale MMorality MCompetence MSociability F(2, 95) p η2p 
Negative Affect .10 (.35) .23 (.56) .06 (.38) 1.35 .264 .028 
Positive Affect -.44 (.45) -.34 (.88) -.19 (.46) 1.37 .259 .028 
       
Fear -.05 (.28) .01 (.45) -.02 (.33) .24 .791 .005 
Hostility .15 (.40) .25 (.79) .05 (.46) .94 .396 .019 
Guilt .40 (.59) .33 (.74) .01 (.42) 4.14 .019* .080 
Sadness .68 (.49) .63 (.71) .34 (.49) 3.25 .043* .064 
Joviality -.55 (.65) -.46 (1.08) -.22 (.41) 1.68 .192 .034 
Self-Assurance -.40 (.49) -.49 (.61) -.25 (.55) 1.59 .210 .032 
Attentiveness -.33 (.74) -.44 (.73) -.14 (.63) 1.49 .230 .030 
Shyness .00 (.34) .01 (.37) -.08 (.48) .50 .611 .010 
Fatigue -.02 (.74) -.30 (.52) -.36 (.44) 3.34 .040* .066 
Serenity -.15 (.98) -.62 (1.13) -.24 (.64) 2.31 .105 .046 
Surprise .57 (.69) .98 (1.04) .62 (.73) 2.30 .106 .046 
Note. *p < .05; For each subscale, the condition showing the largest absolute change is 
presented in bold.  Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations. 
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 1 
Pre-Study for Study 1.3 
Method 
Participants.  Ninety-five participants were recruited through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk.  Eighteen failed to complete the study, leaving a final sample of N = 
77.  The sample was 43% female and represented a diverse range of ages (M = 32.5, SD = 
9.8).   
 Procedure. We first generated a set of thirty traits that we thought would provide 
good coverage of our six theoretical categories.  Participants were presented with each 
trait on a separate page of the study in a randomized order.  For each trait, they rated the 
extent to which it was a “morality trait,” a “sociability trait,” and a “competence trait” on 
nine-point Likert scales (1 = “Not at all”, 5 = “Somewhat”, 9 = “Very much”).  Each of 
these three types of trait was defined in everyday language on the first page of the study, 
and the definitions were repeated on each subsequent page for reference.  A morality trait 
was defined as “a trait that contributes to someone’s being a virtuous person and having 
admirable character,” a sociability trait was defined as “a trait that contributes to a person 
having a warm personality and being enjoyable to socialize with,” and a competence trait 
was defined as “a trait that reflects an ability or capacity that a person has to accomplish 
tasks effectively and succeed in what they set out to do.”  After rating all thirty traits, 
participants completed a brief demographics questionnaire and were debriefed, thanked, 
and paid.  We intended to include three traits in each of the six categories of interest in 
the final study. 
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 This study also included the fully bottom-up trait generation procedure mentioned 
in the General Discussion.  This was included prior to the procedure detailed above, so 
the traits in this pre-study could not have been primed in participants while they were 
completing the bottom-up procedure. 
Results 
 Pure Traits. We intended to include the superordinate category labels “moral,” 
“sociable” and “competent” in the main study, meaning that we needed to add two “pure” 
traits for each dimension.  Our criteria for selecting these pure traits were that each one 
had to have a mean rating on the target dimension of at least seven (on the nine-point 
scale), and that this rating also had to be substantially higher than the ratings on the other 
two dimensions.  We operationalized “substantially higher” in terms of effect sizes rather 
than p-values, which were fairly uninformative.  Specifically, the repeated-measures ds 
(Morris & DeShon, 2002) comparing the target dimension to each of the other two 
dimensions had to be greater than d = .93, which was the mean effect size across all 
comparisons in the study.  Based on these criteria, we retained the traits friendly and 
extroverted for sociability, and effective and talented for competence.  For morality, 
however, only one trait met the criteria: honest.  We chose to retain fair as well, despite 
the effect size comparing morality and sociability ratings being slightly below our 
threshold, d = .79, because it consistently factored with the morality factor in Studies 1 
and 2, and previous research has shown that it is considered to be highly relevant to 
morality, but less relevant to warmth (Goodwin et al., 2014).   
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 “Blended” Traits.  For each of the “blended” categories of morality/sociability, 
morality/competence, and sociability/competence, we needed three traits that received 
high and substantially similar ratings on the two relevant dimensions.  Traits met this 
criterion if they had a mean rating greater than seven on at least one of the target 
dimensions, and an effect size of less than d = .93 (the mean effect size across all 
comparisons) comparing that dimension to the other target dimension.  For example, 
humble, a morality/sociability trait, had a mean rating above seven (M = 7.42) on 
morality, and a mean rating of 6.40 on sociability, meaning that the effect size comparing 
morality and sociability was relatively small, d = .53.  Based on this criterion, we retained 
the traits humble, respectful, and compassionate for the morality/sociability category, 
principled, responsible, and disciplined for the morality/competence category, and 
cooperative and enthusiastic for the sociability/competence category.  To obtain one 
additional sociability/competence trait, we retained dynamic, notwithstanding that its 
highest rated dimension (sociability) received a mean rating of only 6.56.  It should be 
noted that these are within-subjects effect sizes, and therefore are larger than they would 
be if they were converted to the more familiar between-subjects d (see Morris & DeShon, 
2002).  The full trait set, with mean ratings on all three dimensions, can be found in Table 
A.1. 
Pre-Study for Study 1.4 
Method 
 Participants.  Sixty-five participants located in the U.S. were recruited through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange for monetary compensation.  Two participants 
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failed a Captcha question and were excluded.  Thirteen more did not finish the survey, 
but since this study involves no inferential statistics, their incomplete data were retained, 
leaving a final sample of N = 63.  The sample was 38% female, and represented a diverse 
range of ages (M = 33.9 years, SD = 11.7).  
 Procedure.  After consenting to participate, participants were told that “we would 
like you to think of jobs, occupations, or professions that you feel American culture has a 
clear impression of.  For each occupation, Americans should have a clear impression of 
what a person who performs that occupation is like.  For instance, it might be generally 
thought that people in Profession A usually have a particular type of personality.  The 
occupations that you think of can be quite specific, or they can be more general.”  It was 
stressed that there were no right or wrong answers, and participants were clearly 
instructed not to use the same job, occupation, or profession for more than one answer. 
 On the next four pages, participants entered five jobs, professions, or occupations 
that fit four separate criteria, namely ones: “that American culture has a positive overall 
impression of,” “that American culture has a negative overall impression of,” “that 
American culture has a neutral overall impression of.  By neutral, we mean neither 
positive nor negative, but somewhere in the middle,” and “that American culture has an 
ambivalent overall impression of.  By ambivalent, we mean that the impression contains 
both positive and negative elements.  Another way to say this might be that the 
impression is ‘mixed’ or ‘conflicted.’”  We wanted to give participants some criteria to 
meet so that there would be variance in their responses, but we were careful to avoid any 
mention of the three dimensions of interest in our instructions, instead focusing on the 
global valence of society’s “impressions” (i.e., stereotypes).  The order in which 
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participants generated examples in response to each prompt was randomized between-
subjects.  After completing the four pages of the survey, participants completed a brief 
demographics survey, and were thanked, debriefed, and paid. 
Results and Discussion 
A female research assistant, who was blind to the purpose of the study, was given 
a dataset containing every participant’s responses.  Collapsing across the different 
prompts, she was instructed to count the total number of mentions of each profession, 
counting duplicate answers by the same participant only once (only one participant 
repeated an answer; the rest adhered to the instructions not to do so).  We intended to 
retain approximately the 40 most frequently mentioned professions for use in Study 4, as 
a complement to the 38 social groups drawn from prior SCM research with American 
samples.  Because of a tie in the number of mentions, we retained 41 professions 
(indicated by asterisks in Table A.3). 
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Table A.1. Traits used in Study 1.3, with mean ratings on morality, sociability, and 
competence, and within-subjects ds for all comparisons from the pre-study. 
Trait MMorality MSociability MCompetence dMS dMC dSC 
Moral - - - - - - 
Honest 8.47 6.44 5.48 1.01 1.22 .40 
Fair 7.45 6.08 4.94 .79 1.05 .53 
Sociable - - - - - - 
Friendly 5.06 8.60 4.04 1.40 .42 1.57 
Extroverted 2.99 7.84 4.42 1.51 .58 1.22 
Competent - - - - - - 
Effective 3.49 4.18 8.43 .31 1.64 1.57 
Talented 2.88 4.92 8.09 .83 1.66 1.60 
Humble 7.42 6.40 3.71 .53 1.40 1.15 
Respectful 7.55 7.44 4.86 .06 1.08 1.10 
Compassionate 7.64 7.09 3.82 .34 1.42 1.33 
Principled 7.55 5.05 5.90 1.15 .75 .41 
Responsible 6.69 5.58 7.91 .52 .65 1.10 
Disciplined 5.91 4.38 7.75 .65 .85 1.35 
Cooperative 5.04 7.39 6.36 1.04 .57 .55 
Enthusiastic 3.26 7.35 5.39 1.47 .83 .87 
Dynamic 3.09 6.56 6.12 1.30 1.15 .22 
 
 
  
111 
 
Table A.2. Cluster memberships and group-level morality, sociability, and competence 
ratings in Study 1.4.  Groups indicated with an asterisk are the 41 professions retained 
from the pre-study.  Within rows, means with no common subscripts differ significantly, 
p < .05. 
Cluster/Group Morality Sociability Competence 
Cluster 1 Mean 4.08 5.37 4.05 
Salespeople* 3.10a 6.24b 5.50c 
Garbage Collectors* 4.92a 4.16b 3.93b 
Fast Food Employees* 4.25a 4.62b 3.05c 
Politicians* 2.78a 5.10b 4.28c 
Used Car Salesmen* 2.33a 5.58b 4.48c 
Taxi Drivers* 3.95a 4.73b 4.35c 
Disabled 5.83a 4.95b 4.13c 
Lesbians 4.67a 5.18b 5.14b 
Sexy Women 3.72a 6.81b 3.85a 
Retarded 4.60a 5.38b 2.59c 
Janitors* 4.94a 4.59b 3.88c 
Young People 4.26a 6.38b 4.70c 
Blacks 4.43a 5.26b 4.80c 
Hispanics 4.53a 5.28b 4.70a 
Poor Whites 3.59a 4.30b 2.82c 
Strippers* 2.55a 6.52b 3.58c 
House Cleaners 4.77a 4.79a 4.24b 
Babies 4.28a 6.83b 2.80c 
Cluster 2 Mean 6.67 5.41 7.42 
Teachers* 6.98a 6.50b 6.99a 
Judges* 7.29a 4.11b 7.15a 
Doctors* 7.24a 5.86b 8.03c 
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Chefs* 6.34a 6.28a 7.37b 
Firefighters* 8.03a 7.20b 7.94a 
Electricians* 5.61a 5.28b 7.03c 
Educated 6.41a 5.33b 7.63c 
Dentists* 6.16a 5.32b 7.32c 
Businesswomen 5.92a 5.46b 6.79c 
Nurses* 7.21a 6.67b 7.35a 
Librarians* 7.05a 4.88b 6.81c 
Scientists* 6.87a 3.87b 8.21c 
Professionals* 5.92a 5.40b 7.68c 
Accountants* 5.80a 3.78b 6.95c 
Asians 6.02a 4.58b 7.50c 
Veterinarians* 7.25a 6.54b 7.48c 
Engineers* 6.78a 4.71b 8.12c 
Soldiers* 7.20a 5.68b 7.21a 
Cluster 3 Mean 2.20 3.14 2.99 
Telemarketers 2.25a 3.96b 3.19c 
Poor Blacks 2.87a 3.97b 2.97a 
Welfare Recipients 2.58a 3.54b 2.61a 
Homeless 2.15a 2.39b 2.07a 
Drug Dealers 1.48a 2.61b 2.37b 
Terrorists 1.36a 1.47a 3.33b 
Poor People 3.21a 3.95b 2.71c 
Psychopaths 1.33a 2.23b 3.61c 
Arabs 3.01a 2.64b 4.42c 
Prostitutes 1.76a 4.61b 2.62c 
Cluster 4 Mean 5.67 5.94 5.86 
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Southerners 5.53a 6.54b 4.40c 
Middle Class 6.41a 6.14b 6.34a 
Whites 6.05a 6.20a 6.61b 
Women 6.19a 6.83b 6.02a 
Blind People 5.92a 4.72b 5.02c 
Black Professionals 5.62a 5.60ac 5.85bc 
Men 5.76a 5.84a 6.88b 
Artists* 5.49a 6.33b 6.63b 
Cosmetic Surgeons 4.70a 5.61b 7.31c 
Plumbers* 5.09a 4.79a 6.01b 
Postal Workers* 6.25a 5.50b 5.47b 
Jews 5.19a 4.94a 6.59b 
Native Americans 5.45a 4.61b 5.09c 
Blue Collar Workers 6.09a 5.76b 5.92ab 
Housewives 6.11a 6.45b 5.29c 
Motivational Speakers 5.95a 7.28b 6.92c 
Christians 6.43a 5.78b 5.53c 
Waiters/Waitresses* 5.74a 6.90b 5.08c 
Students 5.10a 6.31b 6.07b 
Clergy* 6.42a 5.62b 5.76b 
Northerners 5.57a 5.24b 6.30c 
News Anchors* 5.19a 6.33b 5.97c 
Secretaries* 5.88ab 6.20a 5.70b 
Athletes* 5.15a 6.75b 7.15c 
Elderly 6.82a 5.64b 4.64c 
Social Workers* 6.50a 5.73b 6.08c 
Evangelical Christians 5.79a 5.32b 4.62c 
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Managers* 5.42a 4.99b 6.04c 
Gay Men 4.59a 6.67b 5.23c 
Actors* 4.73a 6.90b 6.36c 
Construction Workers* 5.00a 5.10a 5.72b 
Children 5.33a 7.47b 4.95c 
Cluster 5 Mean 3.85 3.95 5.46 
Mechanics* 4.03a 4.61b 6.23c 
Muslims 3.73a 3.20b 4.49c 
Atheists 3.62a 3.96b 4.54c 
Private Military Contractors 3.50a 3.26a 6.11b 
Feminists 4.65a 4.02b 4.94c 
CEOs* 3.28a 4.56b 6.10c 
IRS Agents* 3.56a 2.33b 4.85c 
Lawyers* 3.52a 4.62b 6.87c 
Rich People 3.84a 4.95b 5.96c 
Bankers* 3.51a 4.01b 5.83c 
Police Officers* 5.29a 4.25b 5.49a 
Migrant Workers 3.67a 3.66a 4.06b 
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Table A.3. Factor loadings of 29 emotion terms in Study 1.4.  Factor loadings below .40 
are not shown. 
 Factor 1 - 
Antipathy 
Factor 2 – 
Admiration 
Factor 3 – 
Sympathy 
Factor 4 - 
Envy 
Tension .925 - - - 
Anxiety .920 - - - 
Fear .904 - - - 
Anger .891 - - - 
Hatred .888 - - - 
Unease .879 - - - 
Resentment .853 - - - 
Frustration .837 - - - 
Irritation .832 -.429 - - 
Contempt .831 -.488 - - 
Disdain .808 -.556 - - 
Disgust .768 -.585 - - 
Disappointment .766 -.562 - - 
Shame .674 -.566 - - 
Pride - .862 - - 
Admiration - .830 - - 
Respect -.422 .826 - - 
Security - .811 - - 
Inspiration - .802 - - 
Comfort -.493 .779 - - 
Fondness -.443 .759 - - 
Condescension .599 -.733 - - 
Joy -.413 .698 - - 
Affection - .684 .487 - 
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Sympathy - - .892 - 
Pity - -.548 .724 - 
Compassion - .560 .715 - 
Jealousy - - - .930 
Envy - - - .884 
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Figure A.1.  Admiration ratings at ± 1 SD from the mean on morality and sociability 
ratings, in Study 1.4. 
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Figure A.2.  Envy ratings at ± 1 SD from the mean on morality and sociability ratings, in 
Study 1.4. 
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APPENDIX B: BOGUS PERSONALITY ASSESSMENTS AND RESULTS SHEETS 
FROM STUDY 3.3 
 
 
In all conditions, the results sheet was filled out by hand by the research assistant as 
follows: the first blank was filled in with 36%, the second blank was filled in with 64%, 
and “Relatively Low” and “Below Average” were circled for the summary statements. 
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Personality Assessment 
 
Instructions: Write or circle your answers to the questions below. 
 
1. How many hours a week do you spend contributing to charitable causes? (Enter a 
number):  _____  
 
2. When was the last time you told a lie? (Enter the number of weeks ago that you last 
told a lie): ______ 
 
3. Imagine that you encounter a person on the street who appears to be injured.  What 
would you be most likely to do? 
-Continue walking, and leave the person 
-Look around and see if there is anyone else around; if there is, continue walking and let 
them help the person 
-Ask the person if they are all right, and offer to help 
-Shout for help 
-What I would do would depend on how much of a hurry I was in 
 
4. Suppose that you saw a group of people making fun of someone for the way he looks.  
How likely would you be to step in and try to stop them? 
-Very unlikely 
-Unlikely 
-Somewhat unlikely 
-Somewhat likely 
-Likely 
-Very likely 
 
5. How many people have you thought unkind things about in the last thirty days? (Enter 
a number): ____ 
 
6. Suppose you are playing an anonymous game where you have been given $100 for 
free.  There is another player in another room whom you will never meet.  You can give 
any portion of the money to this player, and keep the rest for yourself.  How much would 
you give the other player (knowing that you will keep the rest for yourself)? (Enter a 
number): _____ 
 
7. Consider the following scenario: 
 
Jim’s wife is dying from cancer, and the only drug that could help her is a form of radium 
that a doctor in his town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but 
the doctor was charging ten times what the drug cost him to produce. He paid $200 for 
the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. Jim went to everyone he 
knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is half of 
what it cost. He told the doctor that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or 
let him pay later. But the doctor said: “No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make 
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money from it.” Jim is desperate, and is considering breaking into the man's laboratory to 
steal the drug for his wife.  
 
What would you do in Jim’s position? Why? 
- I would not steal the medicine because it is illegal. 
- I would steal the medicine because everyone has a right to live, regardless of the law. 
- I would not steal the medicine because the scientist has a right to fair compensation. 
Even if Jim’s wife is sick, that does not make stealing right. 
- I would steal the medicine, because saving a human life is a more fundamental value 
than the property rights of another person. 
 
8. Consider the image below.  Think about what you think is happening in the image.  
What do you think the story is behind the image?
 
Below are three brief stories.  Which one is most similar to what you think is happening 
in this image? 
-The little girl is holding her doll and ignoring what the maid is saying, because she 
thinks the maid is inferior to her. 
-The little girl is holding her baby brother, and her mother is instructing her how to hold 
him so that he does not get hurt. 
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-The little girl is holding her doll and her mother is trying to take it away as a 
punishment, which is why the girl looks upset. 
 
 
9. Consider the following five words: dishonest, trustworthy, lie, deceitful, unkind. 
Which three words most naturally “go together” to make a coherent set? 
 
 
 
 
10. Below are five terms that may or may not describe you well.  We would like you to 
tell us how well you think each term describes you, compared to the average person.  
Before answering, think about people that you know, so that you have a baseline average 
to compare yourself to.  Then, for each trait, tell us on a scale of 1 to 9 how well it 
describes you.   
 
I am much less       I am much 
more 
like this than         like this than 
the average person       the average 
person 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Dishonest _____ 
 
Unfair _____ 
 
Uncompassionate _____ 
 
Principled _____ 
 
Humble _____ 
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Stanford-Grey Short-Form Morality Assessment: Results 
 
The questions that you just answered are a standard psychological test called the 
Stanford-Grey Short-Form Morality Assessment.  It is designed to assess the sophistication of 
how you think about concepts relating to morality (and immorality) as well as your level of moral 
and immoral behavior.  In other words, it is a standard assessment of how well you can be 
described by personality traits such as loyal, honest, and benevolent. 
The original Stanford-Grey inventory was developed in 1992, and the short-form revision 
that you took was developed in 1998.  Since then, it has been used in well over 200 psychological 
studies, most of them involving college undergraduates like you.   
Like any psychological test, there is some degree of measurement error in the Stanford-
Grey scale. In other words, it is not a perfectly accurate test, and any result is only an 
approximation.  Nonetheless, it has been shown to be a valid and reliable measure of a person’s 
moral thinking, and to predict actual, real-world moral behavior with reasonable accuracy. 
We can compare your answers to those of the thousands of other people like you who 
have taken this personality assessment.  In other words, we cannot say “you are X% moral”, but 
we can say how moral or immoral you are compared to other people. 
 
Based on your answers, when compared to people of your sex/gender and approximate 
age, YOU ARE MORE MORAL THAN ________% OF OTHER PEOPLE, AND LESS 
MORAL THAN ________% OF OTHER PEOPLE. 
The sophistication of your moral thinking is:  
Relatively Low  About Average Relatively High 
Your level of moral behavior is: 
Below Average About Average Above Average 
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Personality Assessment 
 
Instructions: Write or circle your answers to the questions below. 
 
1. How many hours a week do you spend studying for your classes? (Enter a number): 
_____ 
 
2. When was the last time you did worse on an assignment or project than you hoped? 
(Enter the number of weeks ago that you last did worse on an assignment or project than 
you hoped): _____ 
 
3. Imagine that you are working on a collaborative project with a coworker.  What would 
you be most likely to do? 
-Let them take the lead, and do what they needed me to 
-Figure out how good they are at the task; if they are good at it, let them take the lead 
-Take the lead, and do most of the work 
-Split the work about equally and try to work collaboratively 
-What I would do would depend on what kind of project it was 
 
4. Suppose that you were assigned a project that was not due for several months.  How 
likely would you be to start working on it this week? 
-Very unlikely 
-Unlikely 
-Somewhat unlikely 
-Somewhat likely 
-Likely 
-Very likely 
 
5. What is/was your college grade point average? (Enter a number): ____ 
 
6. Suppose that you are financially comfortable, and you have $100 that you want to 
invest.  You are going to split it between Investment A and Investment B.  Investment A 
has an average rate of return of 30%, but a 20% chance that all of the money you invest 
in it will be lost.  Investment B has an average rate of return of 40%, but a 25% chance 
that all of the money you invest in it will be lost.  How much would you invest into 
Investment A (knowing that you will invest the rest into Investment B)? (Enter a 
number): _____ 
 
7. Consider the following scenario: 
 
Jim is the CEO of a company.  He is about to release a new product, and his engineers 
have designed two versions of the product.  Version 1 will make more money for the 
company, for Jim, and for his shareholders, but Version 2 will make his company look 
better to the public.  Jim is carefully considering which version of the product to release.  
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What would you do in Jim’s position?  Why? 
-I would release Version 1 because making money is the primary objective of a 
businessperson. 
-I would release Version 2 because improving the company’s image will help Jim and the 
company in the long run. 
-I would release Version 1 because Jim has a duty to his shareholders to make as much 
money for the company as possible. 
-I would release Version 2 because improving the company’s image will cause 
consumers to buy more of the company’s other products. 
 
8. Consider the image below.  Think about what you think is happening in the image.  
What do you think the story is behind the image? 
 
 
Below are three brief stories.  Which one is most similar to what you think is happening 
in this image? 
-The woman in the foreground is trying to look busy because her boss just entered the 
room and is looking at her. 
-The woman in the foreground is showing the woman in the background how to do 
something. 
-The two women are collaborative partners working on a project together. 
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9. Consider the following five words: ineffective, competent, fail, unsuccessful, 
unintelligent. 
Which three words most naturally “go together” to make a coherent set? 
 
 
 
 
10. Below are five terms that may or may not describe you well.  We would like you to 
tell us how well you think each term describes you, compared to the average person.  
Before answering, think about people that you know, so that you have a baseline average 
to compare yourself to.  Then, for each trait, tell us on a scale of 1 to 9 how well it 
describes you.   
 
I am much less       I am much 
more 
like this than         like this than 
the average person       the average 
person 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Unintelligent _____ 
 
Incompetent _____ 
 
Ineffective _____ 
 
Talented _____ 
 
Efficient _____ 
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Stanford-Grey Short-Form Competence Assessment: Results 
 
The ten questions that you just answered are a standard psychological test called the 
Stanford-Grey Short-Form Competence Assessment.  It is designed to assess the sophistication of 
how you think about concepts relating to competence (and  incompetence) as well as your level of 
competent and incompetent behavior.  In other words, it is a standard assessment of how well you 
can be described by personality traits such as intelligent, talented, and capable. 
The original Stanford-Grey inventory was developed in 1992, and the short-form revision 
that you took was developed in 1998.  Since then, it has been used in well over 200 psychological 
studies, most of them involving college undergraduates like you.   
Like any psychological test, there is some degree of measurement error in the Stanford-
Grey scale. In other words, it is not a perfectly accurate test, and any result is only an 
approximation.  Nonetheless, it has been shown to be a valid and reliable measure of a person’s 
analytical thinking, and to predict actual, real-world outcomes with reasonable accuracy. 
We can compare your answers to those of the thousands of other people like you who 
have taken this personality assessment.  In other words, we cannot say “you are X% competent”, 
but we can say how competent or incompetent you are compared to other people. 
 
Based on your answers, when compared to people of your sex/gender and approximate 
age, YOU ARE MORE COMPETENT THAN ________% OF OTHER PEOPLE, AND 
LESS COMPETENT THAN ________% OF OTHER PEOPLE. 
The sophistication of your thinking is:  
Relatively Low  About Average Relatively High 
Your level of competent behavior is: 
Below Average About Average Above Average 
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Personality Assessment 
 
Instructions: Write or circle your answers to the questions below. 
 
1. How many hours a week do you spend at parties or similar social gatherings? (Enter a 
number): _____ 
 
2. When was the last time you made a new friend? (Enter the number of weeks ago that 
you last made a new friend): _____ 
 
3. Imagine that an acquaintance of yours asks you to lunch.  What would you be most 
likely to do? 
-Flat-out turn down the offer and not go 
-Come up with a polite reason to turn down the offer 
-Accept the offer and suggest a good restaurant 
-Go, but reluctantly 
-What I would do would depend on how busy I was 
 
4. Suppose that someone you are only moderately friendly with invites you to a party 
where you would not know anyone besides them.  How likely would you be to go? 
-Very unlikely 
-Unlikely 
-Somewhat unlikely 
-Somewhat likely 
-Likely 
-Very likely 
 
5. How many close friends do you have? (Enter a number): ______ 
 
6. Suppose you have $100 and you are deciding how to spend it.  You are going to split it 
between buying food and drinks during a night out with friends, and buying yourself 
something new that you have been wanting for some time.  How much would you spend 
on the dinner (knowing that you will spend the rest to buy yourself something new)? 
(Enter a number): _____ 
 
7. Consider the following scenario: 
 
Jim has been invited to two events on Saturday night.  The first event is a board game 
night with three of his close friends.  The second event is a party with a large number of 
friends that he is a bit less close with.  Jim is considering which event to go to. 
 
What would you do in Jim’s position?  Why? 
-I would go to the party because I like large social gatherings. 
-I would go to the board game night because I prefer to spend time with smaller groups of 
people. 
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-I would go to the party because I am more likely to meet someone new there than I 
would be at board game night. 
-I would go to the board game night because I would rather be with my closest friends, 
even if there are fewer people total. 
 
8. Consider the image below.  Think about what you think is happening in the image.  
What do you think the story is behind the image? 
 
Below are three brief stories.  Which one is most similar to what you think is happening 
in this image? 
-The boy is waiting for his friends to arrive so that they can play together. 
-The boy is lonely, and is watching other children play in the distance. 
-The boy does not like the other children in his neighborhood, so he is playing by 
himself. 
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9. Consider the following five words: shy, outgoing, withdraw, introverted, cold. 
Which three words most naturally “go together” to make a coherent set? 
 
 
 
 
10. Below are five terms that may or may not describe you well.  We would like you to 
tell us how well you think each term describes you, compared to the average person.  
Before answering, think about people that you know, so that you have a baseline average 
to compare yourself to.  Then, for each trait, tell us on a scale of 1 to 9 how well it 
describes you.   
1 = I am much less like this than the average person 
5 = I am about average on this term 
9 = I am much more like this than the average person. 
 
I am much less       I am much 
more 
like this than         like this than 
the average person       the average 
person 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Introverted _____ 
 
Unfriendly _____ 
 
Cold _____ 
 
Easy-Going _____ 
 
Sociable _____ 
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Stanford-Grey Short-Form Sociability Test: Results 
The ten questions that you just answered are a standard psychological test called the 
Stanford-Grey Short-Form Sociability Assessment.  It is designed to assess the sophistication of 
how you think about concepts relating to sociability (and unsociability) as well as your level of 
sociable and unsociable behavior.  In other words, it is a standard assessment of how well you can 
be described by personality traits such as likable, cheerful, and friendly. 
The original Stanford-Grey inventory was developed in 1992, and the short-form revision 
that you took was developed in 1998.  Since then, it has been used in well over 200 psychological 
studies, most of them involving college undergraduates like you.   
Like any psychological test, there is some degree of measurement error in the Stanford-
Grey scale. In other words, it is not a perfectly accurate test, and any result is only an 
approximation.  Nonetheless, it has been shown to be a valid and reliable measure of a person’s 
interaction style, and to predict actual, real-world sociable behavior with reasonable accuracy. 
We can compare your answers to those of the thousands of other people like you who 
have taken this personality assessment.  In other words, we cannot say “you are X% sociable”, 
but we can say how sociable or unsociable you are compared to other people. 
 
Based on your answers, when compared to people of your sex/gender and approximate 
age, YOU ARE MORE SOCIABLE THAN ________% OF OTHER PEOPLE, AND 
LESS SOCIABLE THAN ________% OF OTHER PEOPLE. 
The sophistication of your social interaction style is:  
Relatively Low  About Average Relatively High 
Your level of sociable behavior is: 
Below Average About Average Above Average 
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